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Abstract 
Through personal interviews with young nationalists from Belgium, Hungary, and Sweden, I seek 
to understand what motivates young people to identify with far-right nationalism in Europe. By 
providing an individual-level investigation of what motivates young Europeans’ nationalist 
ideology, I deliver a humanized, nuanced, and multidimensional understanding of nationalist 
views for young people in Europe. This analysis demonstrates that nationalism in Europe is not 
the same across different countries. With my sample set of Belgium, Hungary, and Sweden, 
representing Western, Central, and Northern Europe respectively, it is clear that nationalism varies 
according to the context within which it exists. In addition to exposing the differences, the research 
reveals similarities across the interview subjects including feelings of patriotism and self-
proclaimed national love, an anti-establishment and rebellious nature, aversion to outsider groups, 
a call for traditionalism and resistance to change, and rhetoric which frames national identity 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
 Nationalism is not a new phenomenon in Europe. Throughout history, nationalist 
ideologies have developed in ways reflecting the context of their time. Fueled by complex issues 
that vary by country, nationalist political parties and social movements exist across the continent 
and continue to grow.  
 My study focuses on far-right nationalist youth in Europe and what motivates their 
nationalism. I chose youth because they signify the future of nationalism in their own countries. 
What motivates radical nationalism for youth in Europe? To begin answering this question, I 
interviewed nationalist youth from European countries across different geographic areas of the 
continent from Belgium, Hungary, and Sweden. My investigation focused on what led these 
youth to identify with nationalism and a look into their core beliefs on issues such as minority 
groups, immigration, multiculturalism, Islam, and the European Union. The interviews deliver 
individual-level accounts from young nationalists in Europe as to what drives their views. This 
investigation also illuminates the similarities and differences among them. Through personal 
interviews with young European nationalists, I provide a humanized account of differences in 
nationalist views across a sample set of European countries while simultaneously identifying 
similarities among them. Through the sample cases of Belgium, Hungary, and Sweden, the 
interviews reveal that nationalism does not look the same in one context to the next.  
 Existing literature seeks to explain why Europeans are drawn to nationalist political 
parties. The question of why someone would identify with nationalism is nothing new. The 
literature utilized measurable variables such as income level, level of education, and exposure to 
cultural or racial diversity according to where the individual lives. The standard conclusion of 
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such research that nationalists are low- to middle-income, uneducated, and limited in their 
exposure to cultural or racial diversity. This type of narrative dismisses those who are not 
working-class, have achieved high levels of education, and grew up in diverse, multicultural 
areas. I am not rejecting findings that nationalists may have low levels of education and come 
from working-class backgrounds; rather, I seek to discuss a multidimensional understanding of 
young nationalists in Europe.  
 Within Belgium, Hungary, and Sweden, I concentrated on the political parties Vlaams 
Belang, Jobbik, and Sverigedemokraterna (the Sweden Democrats). Flanders and Hungary have 
other nationalist parties,1 but I chose Vlaams Belang and Jobbik to study because they sit further 
outside the mainstream and are considered more radical. I interviewed young members from 
each of these parties and aimed to find common themes among them. It is no surprise that the 
reasons a Hungarian supports Jobbik differ from the reasons a Swede supports the comparatively 
moderate Sweden Democrats.  
 My research and analysis draw from numerous sources, including academic books and 
scholarly articles, news media, online media platforms such as political websites and social 
media, official statements, opinion polls, personal visits to European Union institutions and 
officials, and personal interviews. One notable drawback with this research is that it was almost 
entirely done in English. All interviews were conducted in English. English is the native 
language of none of the interviewees, though they are all fluent English-speakers. All print 
source material was in English or French. Some print source materials were in Dutch, Hungarian, 
or Swedish, which I translated into English.  
 
                                               
1 In Belgium, there are two Flemish nationalist parties: Vlaams Belang and Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie. In Hungary, 
there are also two nationalist parties: Jobbik and Fidesz.  
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Methodology 
Personal interviews comprise my primary resource in this paper. Interview subjects range 
from the age 20 to 29; therefore, my concept of youth in this paper encompasses young adults in 
their twenties. All European, the interviewees represent different countries including Belgium, 
Hungary, and Sweden. With my primary thesis advisor’s help, I contacted interviewees from 
Sweden. I contacted interviewees from Belgium and Hungary by reaching out to them via email 
and setting up interviews based on the positive responses I received. Prior to this work, I had no 
personal connection with any of the interview subjects. The interview subjects are leaders or 
rank and file members of nationalist political parties.  
 
Chapter 2: Framework for Understanding Nationalism 
Different forms of nationalism 
 This chapter lays out my concept of nationalism and the framework I applied to help 
structure my understanding of the nationalist ideologies in the parties analyzed and individuals 
interviewed. Nationalism often elicits a negative response from people, conjuring images 
associated with Nazism. The individuals I interviewed all self-identified as nationalists, and I 
therefore describe them as nationalist in this paper. My concept of nationalism derives from Dr. 
Benjamin Teitelbaum, who defines nationalists as those who “claim to fight against immigration 
and globalization in order to purify their chosen national people.”2 
In my work I utilized a framework that branches nationalist ideologies into three main 
categories: cultural nationalism, ethnic nationalism, and identitarianism. This framework helps 
distinguish the differences between the political parties and individuals analyzed. It also 
                                               
2 Page 1, Teitelbaum, (forthcoming) Lions of the North: Sounds of the New Nordic Radical Nationalism.  
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supplements understanding on what the parties and individuals I describe are and what they are 
not.  
Disregarding race or ethnicity, cultural nationalism seeks to preserve a nation’s culture. 
Cultural nationalists detest outside cultures influencing or dominating their own national culture. 
For parties like the Sweden Democrats or Vlaams Belang, whose policies can be described as 
cultural nationalist, it is possible for anyone to migrate to Sweden or Belgium as long as they 
completely adopt the Swedish or Belgian culture and abandon the culture they come from.  
Ethnic nationalism describes the ambition of nationalist individuals and movements to 
preserve a specific ethnic group. Unlike cultural nationalism, ethnic nationalism argues it is 
impossible for a migrant to Sweden, for example, to become Swedish if they do not possess 
Swedish ethnicity.  Cultural nationalism is more open to outsiders than ethnic nationalism 
because, in theory, anyone can adopt a culture, but not anyone can adopt a race or ethnicity, 
which is inherited. 
The third branch of nationalism is Identitarianism.3 Teitelbaum explains that “identitarian 
forces emphasize both pan-European and local ethnic identities over those of the nation.” 
Identitarianism emphasizes a “right to difference” of ethnic groups in a postmodern world. 
Identitarians also believe in a pluriversum, or a world possessing a plurality of cultures and 
ethnicities. Certain identitarian ideas and the concept of a pluriversum are apparent in the 
responses of some of the interviewees.4 
                                               
3 Identitarianism defined by the French New Right: “The end of the 20th century marks both the end of modern 
times and the beginning of a postmodernity characterized by a series of new themes: preoccupation with ecology, 
concern for the quality of life, the role of “tribes” and of “networks,” revival of communities, the politics of group 
identities, multiplication of intra- and supra-state conflicts, the return of social violence, the decline of established 
religions, growing opposition to social elitism, etc. . . Modernity will not be transcended by returning to the past, 
but by means of certain premodern values in a decisively postmodern dimension.” Manifesto of the French New 
Right in Year 2000. 
4 See Teitelbaum, page 18; Manifesto of the French New Right in Year 2000 by Alain de Benoist and Charles 
Champetier; and, Against the Modern World by Mark Sedgwick.  
I n g i n o  | 7 
 
 The forms of nationalism I detailed are not intended to pigeon-hole the actors discussed 
in this paper into narrow, specific categories. Many of the actors here may overlap with two, or 
all three, of the nationalist forms I described. There is not a clear cut definition for understanding 
nationalists and the differences in their ideologies. Rather, this framework clarifies 




Chapter 3: History and Background 
Section I: Belgium 
 Belgium comprises three different linguistic groups – Flemish, French, and German – and 
three main regions: Flanders, Wallonia, and the Brussels-Capital Region nestled within Flanders. 
Flanders, excluding its French-speaking capital Brussels, is linguistically Flemish, or Dutch. 
Encompassing the northern half of Belgium, Flanders hosts two key nationalist political parties: 
Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie (N-VA) and Vlaams Belang. In this paper, I focus on Vlaams Belang 
and its youth wing, Vlaams Belang Jongeren.  
The Walloon region is Belgium’s French-speaking southern half. Wallonia is 
economically weaker than Flanders and boasts a history of extensive immigration. Although 
Wallonia does not have a major Walloon-nationalist political party like Flanders, it does have 





I n g i n o  | 8 
 
From Vlaams Blok to Vlaams Belang: A Short History 
Situated in Flanders, one of Vlaams Belang’s primary goals is to separate Flanders from 
the rest of Belgium and become its own sovereign nation.5 Vlaams Belang’s (VB; literally means 
Flemish Interest) ideology is rooted in cultural nationalism because it emphasizes the existence 
of a Flemish national identity growing from a common Flemish heritage, tradition, religion, and 
history.6 Not only does VB focus on the existence of this Flemish identity, but it urges the 
preservation of the Flemish identity and culture. In line with its cultural nationalist ideology, 
Flanders must therefore become its own sovereign nation-state, independent from the rest of 
Belgium. In addition to Flemish separatism and preserving Flemish culture, Vlaams Belang’s 
rhetoric consists of anti-immigration, anti-Islamic, and Eurosceptic sentiment. 
In the 1990s and early 2000s, VB experienced what former VB Chairman Gerolf 
Annemans describes as a ‘Golden Age’ in its popularity. During this time, the party was known 
as Vlaams Blok. On 9 November 2004, the Belgian Court of Cassation ruled that Vlaams Blok 
violated the country’s law against racism. This court decision forced Vlaams Blok to formally 
disband and recreate itself as a less radical party with a program that would be more acceptable 
to Belgian laws. Shortly after the court decision, Vlaams Belang was launched on 14 November 
2004 by members of Vlaams Blok; the new Vlaams Belang was now rebranded as a Flemish 
nationalist party, seeking to distance itself from the radical and racist labels of its predecessor.7 
The 2004 Court ruling came at a time when Vlaams Blok was at the peak of its popularity 
in Belgium. In regional elections earlier that year, Vlaams Blok was the largest party in Flanders, 
scoring 24.2% of the vote in the Flemish Parliamentary elections and 32 seats in parliament. But, 
                                               
5 Gerolf Annemans, Interview, 17 July 2015.   
6 Loobuyck & Jacobs, page 30.  
7 “From Vlaams Blok to Vlaams Belang: The Beligan Far-Right Renames Itself” by Jan Erk; also see pages 92 & 96 of 
Moufahim et al. 
I n g i n o  | 9 
 
VB has only declined in votes since then. In the most recent regional elections in 2014, they 
earned 5.98% of the vote and six seats in the Flemish Parliament. VB’s fall in regional voter 
popularity is also reflected in European Parliament elections, where they now have just one 
representative: Gerolf Annemans. To combat the declining popularity, Mr. Annemans retired 
from his position as Chairman after the 2014 elections to encourage a new, young, fresh face to 
take over and help rejuvenate the party.8 This youthful leader is 29-year old Tom Van Grieken, 
the previous Chairman of Vlaams Belang Jongeren. While it remains to be seen whether Mr. 
Annemans’ ambitions for Tom Van Grieken are successful in rejuvenating the party’s support 
among young voters, VB maintains its anti-multiculturalist, Flemish independence, anti-EU, and 
cultural nationalist rhetoric.9  
 
Section II: Hungary 
Background of Jobbik: A Movement for a Better Hungary 
Following the Soviet Union’s dissolution, Jobbik was born in 1999 as a movement of 
conservative, anti-Communist, anti-Socialist Christian university students; from its outset, Jobbik 
was a movement of young people.10 While Jobbik began by strongly supporting Fidesz and its 
rise to power, Fidesz’ support for Jobbik became insufficient and relations between the two 
deteriorated after 2002. With a membership of over 1,500 members, Jobbik rebranded itself in 
2003 as a party that was far more conservative, anti-communist, and anti-globalist than it had 
been before,11 helping it stand out as a more far-right party than Fidesz.  
                                               
8 Gerolf Annemans, Interview, 17 July 2015.   
9 Loobuyck & Jacobs, page 38.  
10 Pirro page 68, and interview with Szabolcs Szalay, 25 August 2015. Jobbik at its founding was called Jobboldali 
Ifjusagi Kozosseg, or “Right-Wing Youth Association, JOBBIK.”  
11 Pirro, pages 68-69, and personal interview with Szalay Szabolcs.  
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Traditionalism comprises a key aspect of Jobbik’s ideology and agenda, with party 
members emphasizing traditional Christian values and ideals of western esotericism.12 Jobbik’s 
President Gábor Vona explains in an interview that “I personally follow traditionalist principles, 
in other words, I believe that Europe should get back to its own roots and rearrange its 
relationship with other traditional cultures that only exist in the East now.”13 Regarding Vona’s 
mention of traditional cultures that only exist in the East, he alludes to his belief that Hungary 
should shift its focus toward Eastern powers such as Russia, China, and Turkey and away from 
Western powers such as the European Union and the United States. Vona describes Hungary’s 
unique positioning as it is affected by both Western and Eastern influence: “The Hungarian 
nation has Turkic origin, and was formed by the Russian steppes into what it is now, then 
wandered to the West to establish a state in the Carpathian basin. Our Western integration has 
been going on for centuries, but we have never forgotten our Eastern origin and they could never 
uproot this concept from our minds.” Vona’s rhetoric illustrates the juxtaposition of Western and 
Eastern influence in Hungary, and it is an aspect figuring prominently into Jobbik’s ideas.  
Building upon its idea of traditionalism, Jobbik rejects modernity and representatives of 
modernity. On Jobbik’s official website, President Vona shares that Jobbik “defies global 
capitalism and three of its key representatives, the USA, the EU and Israel,” and further rejects 
the Renaissance and Enlightenment. Jobbik criticizes all of these forces as instruments of the age 
of modernity.  
In respect to its traditionalist agenda, Jobbik sees value in the Islamic world. Gábor Vona 
refers to the Islamic world as the “only one culture left which seeks to preserve its traditions,” 
                                               
12 See Pirro page 72 and “Vona Gábor about the Islam” from Jobbik’s official website.  
13 See “Vona Gábor, Euro-Atlanticism must be replaced by Eurasianism” from Jobbik’s official website.  
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and even says “if Islam fails the lights will completely go out.”14 While Vona praises Islam’s 
traditionalism, he does not mean Hungary should be a Muslim country. Ágnes Pánczél, a young 
member of Jobbik IT, references Vona’s statements on Islam and adds clarity to the discussion. 
[T]he fact that these Muslim people are very religious, I am not talking about the 
extremists, just normal religious people; they really keep their traditions, it is what we think 
is a good example. It does not mean we think we should convert to Islam. But [Muslims 
have] this active religious life and traditional life, which is a good example, and we think 
we should do the same with the traditional European Christian culture.15 
 
Ágnes Pánczél’s comments demonstrate Jobbik’s emphasis on the role of European 
Christian tradition and culture that in Hungarian society. Jobbik does not envision a Muslim 
Hungary, but rather a Hungary whose culture and traditions are entwined with Christianity as 
Islam is entwined with the culture of Islamic countries. 
Beginning in 2006, Jobbik gained ground in popularity. Jobbik’s voter support continues 
to increase and today it is the third-largest party in Hungary with over 20% of the vote. Recent 
polls suggest Jobbik may even become the second-largest party in the country after Fidesz. 
Speaking to its appeal to younger generations, Jobbik even won the title “far right party for the 
Facebook generation” because of its number of Facebook “Likes” relative to other mainstream 
Hungarian parties including Fidesz.16 Work by Pitsinis takes a socio-psychological perspective to 
Jobbik’s success, arguing that Jobbik effectively “coordinat[es] its socio-psychological campaign 
and mobiliz[es] a series of social grievances for its political benefit.” Jobbik’s ability to embed 
its traditional beliefs into Hungarian political culture elevated Jobbik to become a more popular 
and legitimate political force.17  
                                               
14 See “Vona Gábor about the Islam” from Jobbik’s official website.  
15 Interview, Ágnes Pánczél, 6 November 2015.  
16 Pirro, page 70, citing the EUObserver. As of 10 January 2016, Jobbik has 307,686 ‘likes’ on Facebook compared to 
the ruling party Fidesz with 196,535 ‘likes.’ 
17 Pitsnis, pages 272, 277.  
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Section III: Sweden 
The Sweden Democrats: The Emergence of Sweden’s Radical Nationalist Party 
Born in 1988 as a political party with some ties to neo-Nazism and skinheads, 
Sverigedemokraterna, or the Sweden Democrats (SD), has since distanced itself from this past 
image and emerged as a democratically legitimate and powerful political party in Sweden. 
Sverigedemokraterna, or the Sweden Democrats (SD), grew at a slow yet steady rate through the 
1990s. It was not until the 2006 national elections that SD began attracting media attention after 
it achieved 2.93% of the national vote and secured representation in about half of Swedish 
municipalities. The 2006 elections and SD’s emergence onto the political scene coincided with 
the leftist Social Democrats being ousted from power in the Riksdag and a coalition of center-
right parties taking government control. Despite SD’s success in 2006, there is a 4% threshold to 
gain representation into the Riksdag. Four years later, SD surpassed this threshold by earning 
5.7% of the vote in the 2010 national elections and entered the Riksdag for the first time. SD has 
only continued to gain popularity, achieving 12.9% of the national vote in 2014 and 49 seats in 
the Riksdag. This performance set SD as the third-largest party in the country; today, SD 
fluctuates in polls between being the largest to third-largest party.18 While SD only grows in 
popularity, all other Swedish political parties have refused to cooperate with SD, including 
center-right parties. Swedish media is also sharply critical of SD and its policies, and it remains 
controversial to support SD.19   
                                               
18 Current surveys show SD is the most popular in Sweden: “Yougov: Nu är SD Sveriges största parti,” Metro.se.  
19 See Hellström, Nilsson, and Stoltz Nationalism vs. Nationalism: The Challenge of te Sweden Democrats in the 
Swedish Public Debate (186-205); Hellström, Nilsson, Faculty of Culture and Society, and Malmö University ‘We are 
the Good Guys’: Ideological Positioning of the Nationalist Party Sverigedemokraterna in Contemporary Swedish 
Politics (55-76); and, Teitelbaum, “Come Hear our Merry Song”: Shifts in the Sound of Contemporary Swedish 
Radical Nationalism (8).  
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A narrative of cultural nationalism now dominates the Sweden Democrats’ policies and 
views. In the political arena today, SD “has switched its focus from ethnicity to an emphasis on 
culture and impermeable cultural differences,” indicating SD’s desire to preserve traditional 
Swedish culture and “Swedishness.”20 With SD’s focus on Swedish culture rather than more 
limited definitions such as race or ethnicity, it is therefore possible for any person to become 
Swedish in their view. When Swedishness is only attached to Swedish culture, any immigrant to 
Sweden of any background could become Swedish. Indeed, the migrant must regard him/herself 
as Swedish, and others must regard the migrant as Swedish.  
Hellström, Nilsson, and Stoltz argue that in addition to emphasis on Swedish culture, SD 
positions itself as the one true alternative for Swedes dissatisfied with the political elite. 
Following what is labeled as ‘populist,’ SD asserts that it is the party for the ordinary people, and 
criticizes the political elite for not listening to the needs of the common Swedish people.21 
Further, SD establishes itself as a party focused on democratic legitimacy and dialogue that 
promotes freedom of speech; these are characteristics that, according to SD, the other established 
parties in Sweden lack.  
While anyone could theoretically become Swedish, the party maintains a strong anti-
immigration and anti-refugee line. SD’s leadership, including Chairman Jimmie Åkesson and 
SD’s Riksdag group leader Mattias Karlsson, warn that mass immigration to Sweden threaten the 
country’s generous welfare state. Strain on the welfare state correlates with declining social trust 
in Swedish communities. As social trust declines, Swedes become more individualistic and less 
                                               
20 Hellström, Nilsson, Faculty of Culture and Society, and Malmö University, page 61.  
21 Hellström, Nilsson, and Stoltz, page 190. Here they are citing C. Ruzza and S. Fella, Re-Inventing the Italian Right: 
Populism, Post-Fascism and Territorial Identity, London, Routledge, 2009; Paul Taggart, Populism, Buckingham, 
Open University Press, 2000; and M. Canovan, ‘Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy’, 
Political Studies, 47 (1999), pp. 2-16. 
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collectivist. Previously, no other mainstream parties in Sweden talked about issues associated 
with mass immigration or an open-door refugee policy. The Sweden Democrats were the only 
party that discussed these topics openly. As the only party to open up discussion about mass 
immigration, multiculturalism, and refugee issues, SD further built its image as the one true 
alternative for Swedes who were tired of the elitist, mainstream party options.  
 Strong anti-European Union sentiment, a desire to drastically reduce immigration to 
Sweden, cultural nationalist belief, and even the effects of in-grouping vs. out-grouping are also 
factors explaining why Swedish youth identify with right-wing politics. In Scheepers, Werts, and 
Lubbers’ paper, they find growing Euroscepticism post-2002 has been a major factor leading 
Europeans to vote for the radical right.22 In Sweden’s next general election post-2002, the 2006 
general elections, the Sweden Democrats experienced their first notable increase in voter 
support.23 In addition, Evans (2000) found “ethnocentric attitudes [are] strong determinants of 
anti-EU stances,”24 suggesting that ideas of ethnocentricity also play a role in anti-EU views.  
Maureen A. Eger looks at Sweden as a case study, considering the idea of in-groups vs. 
out-groups and how a population’s homogeneity affects the population’s support for the welfare 
state. Eger’s tests find that in Swedish communities of high homogeneity, there is greater support 
for a generous welfare state. In Swedish communities with higher heterogeneity, support for a 
generous welfare state decreases; in other words, communities with a larger number of 
immigrants had an adverse effect on individual Swedes’ support for a generous welfare state. 
Eger attributes this trend to the premise of in-groups and out-groups, suggesting that Swedes 
support a generous welfare state because they have the sense they are “all in the same boat” 
                                               
22 Scheepers, Werts, and Lubbers, pages 187-188. 2002 is the year the Euro went into circulation in the European 
Union, representing deeper EU integration and less sovereignty to the member states.    
23 Rydgren, page 58.  
24 Scheepers, Werts, and Lubbers, page 188.  
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together when the population is more homogeneous.25 The in-grouping and potential preference 
for a homogeneous community that Eger alludes to may lead some Swedes to support parties like 
the Sweden Democrats that seek to reduce immigration. 
 Research by Oskarson and Demker argues that the weakening appeal of Sweden’s ruling 
party, Socialdemokraterna/the Social Democrats, to working-class Swedes has created a vacuum 
in which more working-class Swedes are drawn to the Sweden Democrats. The decline of the 
Social Democrats is linked to working-class Swedes viewing that the welfare state is in crisis. 
Former Social Democrat minister Morgan Johansson reaffirmed this perception about the 
welfare state, stating that “many voters with a working-class background switched their 
allegiance to the SD because they thought that the Social Democrats had not sufficiently 
compensated for the erosion of welfare institutions.”26 In addition to the Social Democrats’ 
declining approval, the right-left political divide in Sweden is becoming less polarized. An 
example of Sweden’s political climate becoming less polarized can be seen in the point that it is 
less controversial now to be a supporter of the Sweden Democrats than it was ten years ago. 
Now, it is also more acceptable to point out problems and threats to the welfare state, and more 
parties than just the Sweden Democrats are beginning to accept policies to cut down on 
immigration. The combination of the Social Democrats’ declining appeal and the political 
climate becoming less polarized result in an environment encouraging more working-class 
Swedes to support the Sweden Democrats.27  
 Multitudes of external factors may explain the Sweden Democrats’ rise in support among 
voters, but key points appealing to Swedes include SD’s positions on immigration, refugees, and 
                                               
25 Eger, 210-213; 208.  
26 Hellström, Nilsson, and Stoltz, 197; Dagens Nyheter, 17 October 2006.  
27 Oskarson and Demker, 645-6.  
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Islam. The Sweden Democrats have positioned themselves as an anti-Islamic party. While 
individuals within SD may vary slightly on their attitudes about Islam, their rhetoric on Islam is 
overall negative. Many, but not all, of the refugees pouring into Sweden from countries such as 
Afghanistan, Eritrea, Iraq, and Syria are Muslim; however, Muslim migration into Sweden is not 
a new trend. As Kasturi Sen points out in his writing, Muslim migrants began arriving in Sweden 
during the 1970s and 80s as both workers and political refugees. These migrants originate from a 
range of countries such as Bosnia, Lebanon, and Ethiopia; they belong to varying ethnic groups, 
different theological branches of Islam, and speak different languages. Sweden is a secular 
country where religion is not considered in policy-making. Sen criticizes secularism because 
Swedish policy-making overlooks problems faced by Muslim minorities. Because the individual 
challenges experienced by Muslim minorities are not considered relevant, “cultural, ethnic and 
religious groups have no rights in Swedish legislation.”28  
 
Chapter 4: The Young Faces of Radical Nationalism in Europe 
This chapter introduces and discusses the interviewees from Belgium, Hungary, and 
Sweden. In the first section I introduce Tom Van Grieken from Vlaams Belang. While I was 
unsuccessful in arranging an interview with a current member of Vlaams Belang Jongeren 
(Vlaams Belang Youth), VB’s youth wing, Tom was previously a member of the youth wing and 
served as its chairman before his election to President of VB. Though he is not a current member 
of Vlaams Belang Jongeren, he is a perfect example of a young Flemish nationalist with an 
influential voice in Vlaams Belang and Flemish politics. I then transition to a brief section on 
                                               
28 Sen, 221.  
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Jeune Nation, a youth Identitarian movement in Wallonia. I did not interview anyone from Jeune 
Nation, but I use this space to introduce the movement because its rhetoric is still relevant here.          
Following Belgium, I introduce three young Hungarian members of Jobbik’s youth wing, 
Jobbik Ifjúsági Tagozat. Finally, I transition to Sweden and look at the Sweden Democrats’ 
former youth wing, Sverigedemokratisk Ungdom (the Sweden Democrats Youth, or SDU). The 
Sweden Democrats Youth underwent internal turmoil in its relationship with the mother party 
throughout my period of study.29 This turmoil led SD to cut its ties with SDU and create a new 
youth league, Ungsvenskarna, or the Young Swedes. Since September 2015, SD and SDU 
severed formal ties, but SDU continues to exist independently. In this study, I focused on SDU 
rather than Ungsvenskarna. Former or current leaders of SDU were interviewed, each of whom 
were expelled from SD in 2015: Gustav Kasselstrand, William Hahne, and Jessica Ohlson. None 
of them are members any longer of SD, and none were members of Ungsvenskarna. But, they are 










                                               
29 Personal interviews with Gustav Kasselstrand and Henrik Vinge; Articles “Nya SDU-ledaren blir frontfigur mot 
Åkesson,” “Konflikten trappas upp - SDU anmäler SD till Datainspektionen” by Aftonbladet.  
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Section I: Flanders 
 
Figure 1. Tom Van Grieken 
A key figure in the Flemish nationalist movement is Tom Van Grieken, Vlaams Belang’s 
Chairman. Elected at the age of 28, Tom is the youngest-ever party chairman in Belgium.30 He 
exudes a confident and energetic personality. In televised speeches, debates, and interviews Tom 
is poised, well-dressed, and speaks in a calm, unassuming manner. I enjoyed talking to Tom in 
our two interviews over Skype, as he was friendly, humorous, and enthusiastic. Tom’s 
charismatic personality is coupled with openness and blatant honesty; he is not afraid to speak 
his mind, even if some find his words offensive.  
While it may be easy to believe that Vlaams Belang supporters are most likely to come 
from areas with little cultural diversity, Tom explained that he grew up in a multicultural area of 
Antwerp. Reflecting on when he was 15 years old, Tom described his early search for his 
identity and initial interest in political issues.  
I looked for my identity. I noticed that I speak Dutch, and a lot of my classmates didn’t. A 
lot of my friends didn’t, and still don’t. And that is fine. . . If they can have their culture, 
then I want to have my culture. . . I speak Dutch, I feel Flemish. I define myself as Flemish. 
Defining yourself as Flemish is already a political statement. But back then I was not 
politically active. . . . I had my Flemish identity, and I was looking for political issues, 
political debates. And I must say the propaganda back then was quite severe. There were 
                                               
30 « Tom Van Grieken désigné nouveau président du Vlaams Belang. » 
http://www.lesoir.be/684441/article/actualite/fil-info/fil-info-belgique/2014-10-19/tom-van-grieken-designe-
nouveau-president-du-vlaams-belang.  
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only pro’s for multiculturalism. . . Although, I could see there were riots in my streets, 
where I was at times the only native Flemish person left. 31 
 
 Tom’s experience with cultural diversity as a youth allowed him to see, as he put, both 
“the advantages and the disadvantages of multiculturalism.” Despite certain disadvantages, it 
remains socially unacceptable in Belgium to point out problems with multiculturalism. His 
decision to join the anti-multicultural, nationalist Vlaams Belang was a controversial move. Not 
only was he criticized for it, but his family was as well: his father got in trouble at work for 
having a son involved in nationalist politics and people stopped by his mother’s flower shop to 
call her racist or a xenophobe for having a nationalist son. But the negative backlash did not 
deter Tom’s political activity. He is confident in Vlaams Belang’s ideas and principles, and 
believes in his work as part of a personal duty to Flanders and the Flemish people.  
Standing for something. Standing for principles. I really like that. . . . We are not socially 
accepted. People refuse to shake hands with us from other parties. . .  Nobody likes us, but 
we don’t care. And I stand for something. [The mainstream parties] all change opinions all 
the time. . . But we stand for something. Which I also appreciate about the other side, 
extreme left-wing communists, which I hate ideologically, but they stand for something. 
They stand for principles. 
 
 As a young person with a strong sense of Flemish identity, Vlaams Belang was the 
obvious choice for Tom. Becoming politically active during the 2003 election campaign, he 
devoted significant time and work to the party over the years. In 2012, he became Chairman of 
Vlaams Belang Jongeren, VB’s youth wing. Just two years later, Tom was elected Chairman of 
Vlaams Belang. His engagement in politics reflects his desire to make what he perceives as a 
positive impact on society.  
When I was a small child, I always saw my dad, uncle, and grandfather arguing [about 
political debates]… then one day, I asked my grandfather, ‘What if you are right [about 
these issues]? What have you ever tried to change?’ And he said ‘Oh what can I do, I never 
tried to change anything. I am just one person.’ And I thought, later when I have a family, 
                                               
31  Tom Van Grieken, Interview, 24 September & 25 November 2015.  
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and I am a grandfather, I also want to have debates with my sons. . . I always think then, 
when my grandchild comes, and says ‘Grandfather, whatever you say about politics, have 
you ever tried to change it?’ The least that I want to say is I gave it my very best to try to 
change society. 
 
Due to the current refugee crisis, refugees and Belgium’s policy toward them make up a 
large part of Tom’s rhetoric. Consistent with the party’s official line, Tom calls for Belgium – 
and Europe – to close its borders. He also calls for the refugees currently in Belgium to be sent 
out. However, he does not believe they should be sent back to their war-torn countries; rather, 
they should be sent to countries neighboring those they fled. If an asylum-seeker comes to 
Europe, they must apply for asylum in the first EU country of entry, as spelled out in the Dublin 
Regulation. For Belgium, on the western coast of the European continent, the asylum-seekers 
arriving there already passed through several EU countries. Following the Dublin Regulation, it 
does not make sense for asylum-seekers to apply for asylum in a country such as Belgium when 
they already passed through other EU countries.   
Despite the hard line on refugees, Tom’s rhetoric softens on women, children, or 
individuals facing persecution. In these instances, he is more open to Belgium accepting 
refugees. According to the United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR), a 
significant majority of the refugees arriving in Europe are young men.32 “What kind of man are 
you if you leave your family, your wife, your children, in a war conflict to come here? Then you 
are not a refugee. You are a coward, if you leave your wife and children in a warzone. Then I 
have no compassion for them,” says Tom.33 The fact that the large majority of refugees in 
Europe are young men only adds fire to his tough stance on accepting asylum-seekers.  
 
                                               
32 According to September 2015 statistics by the UNHCR, 72% of asylum-seekers coming to Europe were male; the 
number fluctuates but males remain the majority.  
33 Tom Van Grieken, Interview, 25 November 2015.  
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Section II: Wallonia 
Wallonia does not have nationalist political parties like Flanders, but it does have 
Francophone-nationalist movements. An example of this can be seen in the actions of the youth 
movement Jeune Nation, including their well-organized hard bass flash mobs in Wallonia. For 
example, in Charleroi in April 2012 they organized a flash mob in which participants wore pig 
masks, waved the Belgian flag, and danced throughout Charleroi to hard bass music in black 
hoodies. The pig masks are intended as an anti-Islamic message. The flash mobbers brandish 
signs reading “On est chez nous,” literally meaning “You are in our home.” The flash mob in 
Charleroi, along with others, was filmed and posted to Youtube.com, where I viewed it. In the 
video, they write their message in English: “This is our country!”34 
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Section III: Hungary 
 
Figure 2. Ágnes Pánczél 
 Ágnes Pánczél is a 21-year old university student and member of Jobbik IT. She lives in 
a town near Budapest and studies French and Norwegian languages. Our interview was done 
over Skype and I enjoyed talking to her; Ágnes is a friendly, talkative, and thoughtful young 
woman. She was open in sharing her stories and eager to talk about a range of topics. Although 
her camera was turned off during the Skype interview, her voice was full of enthusiasm. In 
Jobbik IT, she is a member of the foreign policy committee and writes articles for Jobbik on 
foreign policy. She also translates many articles every week from French into Hungarian for 
Jobbik MPs. While Ágnes has been a member of Jobbik for just over one year, she has had 
growing political interest since she was 14 years old. Her parents, while they are not members of 
any political party, actively follow political issues and debates in Hungary. Ágnes described how 
she listened to the many political discussions her parents had, and noted that her parents had an 
important role in helping develop her political views: 35  
                                               
35 Ágnes Pánczél, Interview, 6 November 2015.  
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I think my father had a very big influence on me. His political views are very similar to 
mine. He was the biggest influence and he had a lot of arguments with my mother because 
my mother is a leftist. But I think my political preference started with realizing that I always 
loved history and as I was studying history, I realized that there are a lot of things we 
Hungarians can be proud of. That was what led me to this conservative nationalist 
subculture. There are also bands and writers who are connected to these kinds of 
movements. So yes, I became interested in this. . . I never was really a leftist. I talked a lot 
about it with my mother, and with my father also. I listened to them. I always found that 
my father is more right. I always thought that he was right. But when I was little, I think 
that their conversations only affected me in an indirect way. Back then, I didn’t think about 
it and I didn’t understand it all. But I think these early conversations had an effect on me. 
When I became interested in politics, I started reading about rightists in general and 
everything that’s connected to the right: conservatism, nationalism in general, and also 
Christian values.  
 
When I asked Ágnes what kinds of things her father was “more right” about compared to her 
mother, she responded:  
My father always said, we must protect our Hungarian roots and Hungarian culture and we 
must fight for ourselves. My mother argued against this because she thought this was 
against others. Maybe it is typically leftist rhetoric to say this. In Hungary for example, I 
don’t know if [it is also like this] in other countries, but if you say you want to protect your 
culture then you are against anyone else. When my father explained to her it doesn’t mean 
you hate anyone, I don’t hate our border countries or anyone else, I thought ‘yes, he is 
right.’ And he won this debate. [The debates were] always starting from some actual 
political decision.  
 
While her parents were certainly influential initially, Ágnes further developed her views and 
political activity by her own initiative. As Ágnes mentions, studying Hungarian history helped 
her find strong pride in Hungary and in being Hungarian. This sense of pride was influential in 
shaping her nationalist views. While she was forming a nationalist identity, she had not yet 
become a member of any political party; this decision eventually came about when she was 20 
years old:  
The fact that I speak some languages and I like talking to people and meeting new people 
in general led me to politics because Jobbik and especially Jobbik Youth was an 
environment where I could do these things which I like. So maybe that is why. I also had 
some friends who were already members of the local Jobbik in my hometown. That is how 
I started to think about joining. We were just talking about it, and I ask them what they do, 
what they did, and I decided I was interested and I wanted to do something. . . Among 
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youth, Jobbik is becoming really, really popular. It is not shocking now if I share with 
anyone that I sympathize with Jobbik and am also a member. It is accepted nowadays. 
 
As mentioned in the previous section, Jobbik certainly has considerable success in appealing to 
younger generations of Hungarians. Ágnes mentions later in the interview that Jobbik’s 
advertising methods are “very good, very creative” and “catch attention,” speaking to Jobbik’s 
marketing and social media success relative to other Hungarian political parties.36   
 Later in the interview, I asked Ágnes about the ongoing refugee crisis and the mass 
numbers of refugees arriving on the European continent every day, with most of them coming 
from countries such as Syria, Eritrea, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Hungary has come under fire 
internationally for its tough stance on refugees and the construction of a wall along the 
Hungarian border, which was built in reaction to the flood of refugees coming to the country. 
Here, I asked Ágnes if she opposes Hungary accepting a large number of refugees.  
In this great number, yes. We can accept really a very small number of refugees with 
keeping stability and balance in our country. It’s a difficult question because these people, 
in terms of social conditions, it can be very different [here compared to where they are 
coming from]. I think less educated people tend to be more aggressive toward the receiving 
country, or it is more difficult for them to accept our rules and culture in general. I think 
not only for Hungary but for all of Europe, this huge number of refugees is unacceptable 
and this could lead to a tragedy. I hope not, but it could be dangerous. If we accept a lot of 
immigrants, and they just don’t accept our laws and want to live according to the Islamic 
law, that is completely opposed to Hungary because the country has its own laws and 
everyone who resides in Hungary has to obey these laws. So yes, it can be a threat to all 
the European countries I think. If they accept our rules and they live in peace, it’s not [a 
threat], but there are a lot of concepts and it’s hard to explain these many things to this 
many people.  
 
Ágnes opposes Hungary and Europe as a whole accepting massive influxes of refugees, but her 
rhetoric is not angry or aggressive. Her concerns about the refugee crisis, as she chose to present 
them to me, stem from a fear that the mass numbers of refugees arriving in Hungary and other 
                                               
36 Ibid.  
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European countries come from such starkly different cultures and backgrounds that it will lead to 
an array of conflicts and problems. 
 While the refugee topic is an important one in Hungary and for Jobbik, perhaps an even 
more controversial issue is Jobbik’s views on Hungary’s Roma population. Here Ágnes talks 
about some of the problems she sees with the Roma population in Hungary.  
I don’t experience problems personally [with Gypsies], but there are a lot of places in 
Hungary where there are a lot of problems. Jobbik was the party which started talking about 
Gypsy criminals in Hungary. This expression also existed during the Socialist regime in 
Hungary. But after that, it was abandoned because it wasn’t politically correct to talk about 
Gypsy criminals. . . It is a fact that they cause a lot of problems and a lot of conflicts. We 
were the first to even dare talk about these problems because these are problems which 
must be faced and must be solved. There are positive examples. As I told you I know some 
Gypsy people, heard of them or know them by face or name, sometimes maybe talk to 
them, and they are good examples who can integrate themselves in our society. 
Unfortunately the most of them can’t [integrate]. It’s very connected to unemployment. 
During communism, or socialism, in Hungary, all of the citizens must have had jobs. If 
they didn’t have a job, they were locked up. So while most of these jobs weren’t real jobs 
in the way that sometimes they didn’t do anything, very little tasks or it was very boring 
for them, they all had a job, all of the people including the Gypsies. Most of them were 
employed for example in agriculture so they did really simple jobs. They were mostly 
uneducated and after the system changed, these lowly educated people were the first to lose 
their jobs because our agriculture started to decline. As you know Gypsy people have 
children at a very young age and they have more children than us. There are many 
generations now who grew up not seeing their parents work. [Since they grow up without 
seeing] the example of studying properly or working properly, or looking for a job 
properly, it leads to problems. It is very difficult because there are a lot of generations who 
don’t have the chance to integrate. The other parties, the leftist parties or even Fidesz, talk 
about Gypsy integration and giving them work and education. But I don’t see the actions 
behind their words. They just talk about it and they emphasize that we like them and don’t 
hate them and we are not racist and that is why we have to have them. Okay, we have to 
have [the Gypsies] because it is a bad situation. [Fidesz’] speeches involve being only 
politically correct and not seeming racist. When we [Jobbik] started expressing that yes 
there are problems with them and there are a lot of criminal acts and conflicts between 
cultures and all these kinds of things, then we are immediately considered as racists because 
we are not talking in a politically correct way. 
 
Ágnes later goes on to further explain her problem with political correctness. To a certain extent, 
she can understand a degree of political correctness in politics; rather, her issue with the subject 
is when it comes to not discussing topics because of a fear of political incorrectness:  
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Politics has a certain language which must be respected. You can’t use F-words; you have 
to express yourself in a more sophisticated way. But if political correct means that we don’t 
talk about something just because it’s a bit of a taboo topic, it’s bad because I think 
politicians are there to help us and solve a country’s problems and work together for their 
country and for their culture. If it is language that’s politically correct it’s okay; but, if we 
don’t talk about something because it’s politically incorrect, then it’s bad. 
 
Key themes from Ágnes include her love for Hungarian history and culture, desire to defend 
Hungarian culture, her fear of change and disintegration in Hungary because of the perceived 
threat of minority groups such as the refugee and Gypsy populations, and her frustration with 
mainstream political correctness. Factors such as social reasons, family influence, or Jobbik’s 
savvy advertising played roles in developing Ágnes’ political ideas and decision to join Jobbik, 
but they cannot be considered major features in why Ágnes Pánczél came to identify with Jobbik 
and nationalism.  
 
 
Figure 3. Péter Völgyi 
 Another young Jobbik supporter is 26-year old Péter Völgyi, also of Budapest. Originally 
from western Hungary, Péter initially moved to Budapest to pursue a degree in international 
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economics.37 After his studies, he began working with Jobbik, turning away opportunities to 
work in finance and the private sector. Currently, he is president of a local Jobbik IT branch in 
Budapest, situated in district 8 called Józsefváros. He also works as an assistant to a Jobbik 
member of the Hungarian Parliament. More reserved than Ágnes, Péter is matter-of-fact and 
concise. While our interview was over Skype, I found that he spoke and presented himself in a 
calm, relaxed manner. His responses were thoughtful and confident, and his rhetoric 
unaggressive.  
 A member of Jobbik since 2013, Péter is in fact a former supporter of Fidesz, Hungary’s 
largest party. Both parties are described as conservative, nationalist parties, which are 
characteristics Péter says he identifies with as part of a love for Hungary he has always had. But, 
Péter cites growing corruption in Fidesz as the primary factor driving his shift to Jobbik.  
Growing up, Péter spent most of his time with his grandfather, a Fidesz supporter. 
Although they currently align with different parties, Péter says his grandfather played the most 
significant role in shaping his views.    
 
I love Hungarian food, Hungarian language, I think that people always say it is one of the 
most difficult languages in the world, so I am proud of this. I also like the landscape here, 
I think Hungary is very beautiful. I also love Hungarian people. Many people say 
Hungarian people are not too kind, but I don’t think so.  
 
Counter to the rhetoric that is prominent among the Belgians and Swedes I interviewed, Péter 
takes a different perspective on multiculturalism. He does not view it as bad policy, but he only 
agrees with multiculturalism in a limited dose.  
I think multiculturalism can be good to a certain extent. I think that right now, we have a 
very low percentage of people from different cultures and nations here. So right now it is 
good. But, for example, I was in France, England, and Brussels, and I didn’t really like the 
multiculturalism there that much. In Hungary, it’s not too bad; I think it’s good. . . It was 
                                               
37 Péter Völgyi, Interview, 8 November 2015.  
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funny to see, especially in Brussels, there were these historical buildings and a lot of things 
that reminded you of the past 200 or 300 years. But there were a lot of different people 
there, Asian people, African people, Muslims, and it was kind of a shock to me to see how 
many people live in that. I spent three days there, and it was a shock to me to see so many 
different people there. And their behavior was very different compared to the native 
population. But when I studied in university, we had the Erasmus program. There were a 
lot of students there from different countries like Japan or some African countries, and I 
liked to talk to them. I saw this nice change, that you can talk to people from different 
cultures, different regions; I like that. That’s why I say to a certain extent multiculturalism 
is good.  
 
Péter’s rhetoric illustrates that multiculturalism is not a driving issue for him in Hungary. Within 
the context of Hungary, multiculturalism is not a negative force; in fact, it is even good. But, he 
points out Brussels as a bad example of too much multiculturalism. In a context outside of 
Hungary, such as the examples he cites including France, England, or Brussels, multicultural 
policies may be a more significant issue to him. Péter claims multiculturalism was bad in these 
places because there were “a lot of different people there,” citing Asians, Africans, and Muslims 
whose behavior was “very different.” His rhetoric indicates that multiculturalism becomes bad 
when there are too many people who are considered different from what is perceived as the 
acceptable national identity. Multiculturalism is good, according to Péter, when people from 
different cultures and countries can communicate and learn about each other, such as through the 
Erasmus exchanges he describes. His rhetoric suggests an aversion for people living in his own 
country who are considered too different from the national context.  
 As a Hungarian nationalist, it is no surprise that Péter feels a strong sense of love and 
pride for his nation. Preserving Hungarian traditions and culture is important to Péter and to 
Jobbik; here, Péter discusses national traditions in relation to the influx of refugees entering 
Europe from countries such as Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan.  
Hungary is a very old nation. More than thousands of years. We have a lot of traditions. In 
Jobbik we do a lot of things to preserve these traditions. I think that is very important for a 
nation to keep its traditions. In some ways, this is what creates their identity. Right now, 
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Islam is a very big problem for Europe and Hungary with the refugees from Iraq and 
Syria… But in Jobbik, I think that we support every religion in its own country. As long as 
they don’t want to change our culture and our traditions in our homeland, we support them; 
but if they import their culture and tradition and language on us, that’s unacceptable.  
 
Péter’s rhetoric does not demonstrate anti-Islamic sentiment, and his rhetoric on refugees takes a 
cautionary tone but is not negative. He does not want different religions, cultures, or traditions 
imposing themselves upon Hungary; but, his language does not indicate a hatred for what is 
foreign. For Péter, the key point is to preserve what is Hungarian within Hungary.  
 As Islam and refugees may not be as controversial topics for Jobbik as they are for 
Vlaams Belang or the Sweden Democrats, I shifted my questions to Jobbik’s more controversial 
issues, as I did with Ágnes. Jobbik is accused and criticized for being an anti-Semitic party, with 
its leaders, members, and supporters generally suspected as anti-Semites.  
I don’t know whether anti-Semitism is a huge problem or not in Western European 
countries, but in Hungary and Eastern Europe, you can say that there is quite a high 
percentage of people who are to some extent anti-Semitic… I am not anti-Semitic. I don’t 
judge people on their religion or country they originate from. I judge people after I know 
them. But I also have some thoughts about people who are from a different culture than 
me, but I give them the chance to prove me wrong. Anti-Semitism is not true for Jobbik 
because we also have a couple of people who are Jewish in our party. So I don’t think we 
are anti-Semitic, but that is true that a lot of our supporters are anti-Semitic.  
 
Péter denies that he is anti-Semitic, and also that Jobbik is an anti-Semitic party. Both of these 
points may be true, but the question still arises of why are many Jobbik supporters anti-Semites 
if Jobbik is not an anti-Semitic party.  
 The next issue to discuss was Jobbik’s tough position on Hungary’s Roma population. 
Similar to Ágnes, Péter had a lot to say about the Roma and the problems of crime and 
integration they present.  
As for the Gypsies, we are not against them, but that is true there are a lot of problems with 
Gypsies in Hungary and in other countries. Other parties don’t like to talk about the 
problems we have with Gypsies. But we have these problems, and we talk about these 
problems [in Jobbik], and they think that because we talk about this we hate [the Gypsies] 
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and want to push them out of the country, but we just want to solve the problem. In the last 
few years, or decades, there has been a lot of money thrown to the Gypsies to make their 
lives better and things like that, but this money just vanished and we don’t see the results 
of this [investment].There are towns, or parts of towns, where even the police don’t go 
because they know the Gypsies are there and they are criminals. They don’t want to go 
there because they know they can’t do anything. Even if they catch them and put them in 
prison, they get out. The leaders of the Gypsy minorities are corrupt. I think that’s a big 
problem.  
 
Echoing Ágnes’ rhetoric here, Péter voiced frustration with the fact that other parties do not talk 
about problems with the Roma. Hungary’s Roma population and issues associated with them is a 
key talking point for Jobbik, and they are labeled anti-Roma. Péter’s frustration reminisces 
Ágnes’ discussion of political correctness issues, though he did not explicitly talk about political 
correctness.  
 Beyond issues such as the Roma and anti-Semitism, Péter brought up other points of 
discussion that are important to him. He reiterated Jobbik’s youthful quality and mentions 
problems including Jobbik’s education system and high home prices.  
Jobbik is a very young party with a lot of young people. The MPs are also very young. We 
bring up a lot of topics that are important to young people. Like we want to reform the 
schools and universities, because I don’t like the current school system that we have; I 
think it’s old and we have to change it. We also want to encourage young people to have 
families… It’s a huge problem in Hungary that home prices are so high that you can’t make 
a family. We want to address that.  
 
Péter’s mention of encouraging young people to have families reminded me of a point Ágnes 
made in our interview about young Europeans not wanting to have children. As Péter pointed out 
the importance of young couples’ ability to afford homes so they can have children and build a 
family, Ágnes also voiced her despair over Europeans not wanting to have children because of 
how bad the world appears today. Péter and Ágnes’ rhetoric alludes to an urgency to maintain 
their own Hungarian population, as well as a European population. Their rhetoric also illustrates 
the importance they place on families and having children.  
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Figure 4. Szabolcs Szalay 
 Szabolcs Szalay was born March 24, 1989 in Miskolc, Hungary. Growing up in the city 
of Dunakeszi, situated in a metropolitan area of Budapest, Szabolcs was always interested in 
politics, though he was never a member of a party.38 At the age of 12, he began reading 
newspapers and following political issues. After high school, Szabolcs went on to pursue 
bachelor’s and master’s degrees in international studies in Budapest. He also studied in Istanbul, 
Turkey for six months through an Erasmus exchange program. After completing his master’s 
degree in 2013, Szabolcs decided to join Jobbik. Reflecting on what led him to Jobbik, Szabolcs 
explained that he was “born into a right-wing family. My father is a Jobbik supporter, and my 
mother goes between Fidesz and Jobbik.” While his family influenced his political ideas and 
exposed him to right-wing views, he asserted that what he read in newspaper articles and his own 
studies were key in shaping his views. Eventually, it was Szabolcs’ feeling of Hungarian 
patriotism that played the strongest role in leading him to join Jobbik.  
                                               
38 Szabolcs Szalay, Interview, 25 August 2015.  
I n g i n o  | 32 
 
In September 2013 he joined Jobbik and “was immediately elected to president of 
[Jobbik IT’s] local youth branch,”39 quickly becoming actively engaged in the party. Today at 
the age of 27, Szabolcs is an assistant to Jobbik’s Members of Parliament, worked on a foreign 
policy committee to assist Jobbik’s President Gábor Vona, and serves as President of Jobbik IT 
in Dunakeszi.  
While speaking to Szabolcs over Skype, the pride he possessed in not only Hungary but 
also Jobbik was apparent to me. Throughout the interview, he dropped different facts about 
Jobbik and the youth branch, painting the success the party has achieved thus far in Hungary. For 
example, Szabolcs discussed Jobbik’s rising voter support and continuous growth in electoral 
success. He also described Jobbik’s appeal to younger generations and its superior utilization of 
the Internet and social media to attract those between the ages of 18 to 30. In addition to pride in 
Jobbik’s achievements, Szabolcs possesses personal pride in his political work.  
In Jobbik, I can be useful and do things that lead to a better world. I am very proud of this. 
I hope that other members feel this also. In the youth branches, there is a good sense of 
community. It is not just about politics; people can talk about anything together. You can 
hang out, spend time together. We build a community within the youth; we have sports 
days, commemorations, concerts, community days. Jobbik has a young image. The youth 
and mother party have different approaches, because the youth can show they are the next 
generation of people in Hungary. They show that we need jobs, university opportunities, 
and a good future. We are the largest and most successful of the youth branches in Hungary. 
 
Szabolcs speaks to Jobbik’s role in creating a community full of activities that young members 
of Jobbik can participate in and feel engaged in the party through this community. While he 
spoke about the role of the youth branch, he also described his personal pride. In Szabolcs’ mind, 
there is purpose and meaning in the work he is doing now because it will lead to a better world in 
the future.  
                                               
39 Ibid.  
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 Regarding Islam and the Eastern world, Szabolcs discussed a perspective that reminded 
me of the words of Gábor Vona.  
The anti-Islamic message is growing in Western Europe. Now, I am Catholic, and religion 
is very important for me and other people. It is bad that West European parties say they are 
anti-Islam. Really, they are anti-immigrant: it is not about Islam. We must have a good 
relationship with the Muslim world. Roots of Hungary are in the East, and Turkey, a 
Muslim country, is a friendly nation for Hungary. I went to Turkey because of my interest 
in the Balkans. Turkey is an influential country, and I have a good opinion of it. For the 
past 25 years, Hungary’s foreign policy has always been toward Euro-Atlanticism with no 
interest in the East. This has caused Hungary huge problems with its relationship with the 
East and our economy and market. Hungary is in Central Europe; we must care about both 
the West and the East. We are a bridge between two regions. This could give us an 
advantage in Eastern politics. 
 
Of all the interviewees, Szabolcs uses the most favorable rhetoric regarding Islam and the 
Islamic world. He encourages a strong relationship with Islamic countries, while not suggesting 
that Hungary itself should embrace Islam. Szabolcs notes that he is Catholic, and Catholicism is 
practiced by many members of Jobbik, including Gábor Vona. Szabolcs’ mention of his own 
religious belief works both to separate himself from Islam while also making himself relatable to 
those who practice Islam. As Szabolcs and others in Hungary practice Catholicism, others 
practice their own religion, such as Islam, and it is important to them just as Catholicism is 
important to Szabolcs. Further, Eastern countries should play a more important role in Hungarian 
foreign policy than they currently do. The West, embodying actors such as the United States and 
European Union, should not dominate Hungary’s attention because the East is an integral part of 
its identity. Szabolcs effectively describes the importance of Hungary’s relationship with the 
Eastern and Western worlds as the “bridge” between the two.  
 As Szabolcs supports a shift toward the East, he criticizes the West and how little it has 
benefited Hungary.   
People were promised things that weren’t delivered upon. Jobbik used to be considered a 
protest party, but this is not the case now. We don’t want to use disappointment of general 
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politics to be successful. The government promised that Hungary would rise to the living 
standards of the West, like Germany and Austria, but this never happened. . . Now, the 
cooperation of European countries is very important. Hungary has been in the EU since 
2004, but there has been no positive change. It has been worse for us, not better. Hungarian 
society is disappointed with the changes that have been made since joining the EU. The 
EU may be good for some countries and some big companies, but it is not good for 
Hungary. The EU should be a union of free nations working together on certain issues. We 
are giving over a lot to be in the EU. 
 
In Szabolcs’ perspective, the West – specifically the European Union here – has exploited 
Hungary for its own benefit. Western actors and the Hungarian government made false promises 
to ordinary Hungarian people, promising a better living standard and future that never became a 
reality. For Szabolcs and many others, Jobbik is the one true political alternative seeking 
solutions to the issues Hungarian society faces. As Szabolcs mentioned earlier, he can do things 
through his work in Jobbik that leads to a better world and addresses the false promises made by 
actors such as the EU and those in power in Hungary.  
Szabolcs is a confident, well-spoken, and intelligent young man, and I enjoyed talking to 
him. He was always impressively prompt in his email replies to me, a fact which speaks to 
Jobbik’s reputation for its competent handling of Internet use and social media relative to other 
Hungarian political parties. Further, it indicates Szabolcs’ professionalism and how seriously he 
takes his work. His passion for his party and his country is clear. Of the three Jobbik members I 
interviewed, Szabolcs stood out as the one who was most familiar with Jobbik’s official party 
positions and exuded the most confidence and assertiveness about these positions. For Szabolcs, 
Jobbik is the one political alternative for him that best reflects what he believes. Although he 
mentioned that he grew up in a right-wing family sympathizing with Jobbik, he only mentioned 
his family’s influence when I asked about it. Otherwise, he did not mention influence from his 
family, as other factors appeared to play a stronger role in guiding his views. While Hungarian 
patriotism is one theme for Szabolcs, other themes that stand out include his desire to make a 
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positive change in the world through political means, his appreciation for the East and its 
traditions, and frustration with Western powers for their exploitation of Hungary.  
  
Section IV: Sweden 
 
Figure 5. Gustav Kasselstrand 
  28-year old Gustav Kasselstrand is the former Chairman of Sverigedemokratisk Ungdom 
(SDU; the Sweden Democrats Youth) and a key figure in nationalist politics in Sweden. Gustav 
is charismatic and well-spoken. I first met Gustav in Stockholm in August 2015, and interviewed 
him again later over Skype. Since meeting him, Gustav has always been kind and friendly. 
Reminding me somewhat of Tom Van Grieken in his personality, Gustav is honest and speaks 
his mind, though this has brought him considerable criticism from Swedish mainstream media 
and politicians. He is a skilled politician despite his young age, and during his Chairmanship 
from 2011 to 2015 he helped quadruple the size of SDU throughout Sweden. However, in the 
spring of 2015 Gustav and several other SD members came under investigation by SD’s 
leadership for extremism. On April 27, 2015 Gustav and six other members were expelled from 
the party as SD argued they had extremist ties and were not in line with SD’s ideology. Gustav 
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continued to hold his Chairmanship of SDU until September of the same year. While he is no 
longer a member of SD, Gustav now attends Aalto University in Helsinki, Finland to pursue a 
Master’s in Business Administration. In January 2016, he and a friend launched their own 
podcast, “Den kokta grodan,” or “The boiled frog.”  
 Born in the small, picturesque town of Valdemarsvik in Sweden, Gustav described the 
place of his childhood as a safe and secure place with few migrants.40 The town and his life 
growing up were what he perceives as “very Swedish” and preserved from the effects of 
multiculturalism that were more apparent in large Swedish cities. Gustav’s eventual political 
activity was somewhat unusual for his family, as his family is not heavily engaged in politics 
except for some occasional political conversations.  
While political issues were not often discussed at home, Gustav began developing his 
own sense of national identity while he was a teenager in high school in the mid-2000s. He took 
the bus every day to school, and often listened to the Swedish band Ultima Thule during the bus 
ride. Still a fan of Ultima Thule, Gustav explained that he loves the band because “they only sing 
about Sweden and Swedish history and our culture and so on, and that made me aware that this 
country is worth fighting for.” Its songs are not political; rather, it drives a love for the nation. 
Coupled with listening to Ultima Thule, Gustav began thinking about questions of Sweden and 
society as a whole, as well as his roots and history. Gustav’s interest and pride in Swedish 
history was obvious when I met him in Stockholm, as he enjoyed sharing various facts about 
Sweden’s history. At this time, the Sweden Democrats were a small and mostly anonymous 
political party. They held no position in the Riksdag and were mostly unmentioned by the media. 
                                               
40 Gustav Kasselstrand, Interview, 9 August & 22 November 2015.  
I n g i n o  | 37 
 
But, Gustav began hearing about them through the Internet, and found that they discussed topics 
no one else dared touch.  
The Sweden Democrats talked about questions that no one else spoke about. The Sweden 
Democrats spoke about nationalism, Sweden, immigration problems, and these are issues 
you never heard any debate about in the mid-2000s. So I started reading [about them] on 
websites, and I started thinking about these questions when I went to high school and I got 
a real sense of my national identity when I went to high school. 
 
Gustav reflected that it was around 2004 when he started following the Sweden Democrats. It 
wasn’t until 2006 that he decided to join the party as a member, coinciding with the time that he 
moved to Sweden’s second-largest city Göteborg. There, Gustav studied economics at the 
University of Göteborg’s business school. Gustav noted that “joining the Sweden Democrats in 
2006 was quite controversial actually, because they never were written about in the media. And 
if they were written about in the media, it was that they were xenophobes or something like that. 
So for me to join the party was quite a big step actually; but, I felt I had to do it, and I didn’t care 
what anyone would think.”  
 After joining SD in 2006, Gustav began with simply “handing out leaflets and helping 
out on a campaign basis” in Göteborg. He did not have ambitions to become a leader in SD or 
SDU, or to create a political career. At the time, his plan was to pursue a career in business or 
finance, in line with his university studies. Gustav’s involvement in SD was fueled by a love for 
Sweden and desire to be involved and support SD on its path to entering the Riksdag. Previously, 
SD’s goal was to achieve enough of the national vote to enter the Riksdag. This was a cause 
Gustav wanted to participate in.  
Since Gustav did not express interest in taking over leadership positions in SD or SDU 
early on, I asked him what happened that led him to become such a prominent figure for the 
party. Gustav explained how the small size of SDU when he joined made it natural and easy to 
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become involved in leadership roles. In 2008, he joined SDU’s national board and in 2010 was 
elected Vice Chairman of the youth organization. However, his term was short-lived as SDU’s 
then-Chairman William Petzäll resigned two months later. Gustav then took over as temporary 
Chairman and officially assumed the role as Chairman of SDU in 2011.  
It wasn’t that I had some dream to become Chairman of the SDU. But as soon as I was the 
chairman, I decided I’m going to make something really good out of this and I am going 
to turn SDU into a really active youth league in Sweden. SDU didn’t have any real 
operations at that time; we weren’t really visible for people. People thought, ‘Gustav will 
not be able to make something good out of this small organization.’ The SD had had so 
many problems to engage good politicians in all these years, so all the good youth had 
always gone directly to the party [rather than staying in the youth league], and it’s really 
difficult to do something good with a youth league that doesn’t contain many members. 
We had maybe 1,000 members at the time; today, we have over 5,000. We had two or three 
districts at the time, and now we have over 20.  
 
After becoming Chairman Gustav devoted his time and energy to SDU to build it into a large and 
prominent youth organization, coinciding with the electoral growth of the Sweden Democrats 
across the country. Gustav’s commitment to building a strong and successful SDU speaks to the 
importance he placed in not only the youth organization and the party, but also to the importance 
of nationalism for him. I asked Gustav to offer insight into his nationalist feelings and what it 
means for him specifically.  
As a nationalist, you’re never satisfied; you want to learn more and more all the time. You 
want to understand what is happening, to know your roots, to find your identity, to ask 
yourself questions about the Swedish mentality and the Swedish society, why are we 
different from other people – and once you start asking yourself these questions, you never 
stop. It’s almost on a philosophical level. It just becomes deeper and broader over time. As 
a Swedish nationalist, the first feeling you have is ‘I love my country. I love Sweden, I love 
my home.’ But then the next step is that you start digging into this: why do Swedes act in 
a certain way, and what things make us Swedish.  
 
Concepts of identity, heritage, and even a certain Swedish behavior emerge from Gustav’s 
rhetoric. But most importantly for Gustav, he claimed, is his love for Sweden. It is more than just 
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his home, but it also makes up his identity and forms his past. It is an identity which is not only 
for him, but is shared among all Swedes.   
The generous number of asylum-seekers arriving in Sweden poses a threat to preserving 
Sweden and the Swedish identity that Gustav loves. Gustav fiercely criticizes the number of 
asylum-seekers accepted to the country. While Germany accepts the largest number of refugees 
among the European countries, Sweden accepts the greatest number per capita. According to 
Gustav, Sweden lacks sufficient infrastructure and resources to adequately house and provide for 
the asylum-seekers there. Gustav explained that asylum-seekers are present not only in large 
Swedish cities, but in small towns as well such as his hometown Valdemarsvik.  
Many people have profited a lot because they rent out hotels and so on to the migration 
authority. Which meant that my hometown was changed completely in just a few months’ 
time. Who knows if they are staying there for a few years or if they will move to a bigger 
city. It’s showing that immigration today is not only a city problem; you really see it in the 
countryside now, too. It’s become upside-down. Now you see it even more in the small 
cities, [the population density] becomes so close in the small cities! In some cities [the 
immigrants] have even become the majority! It changed [in Valdemarsvik] a few years 
ago. I come home now and again to see my family; I only see immigrants in the city. I see 
a few Swedes . . . but the vast majority of people I see in the town are immigrants. And this 
is a small town where you don’t find many job opportunities, it’s a one-hour drive to the 
nearest city. So of course these people are not getting jobs, they are living off the benefits. 
They are not becoming a part of society. They don’t know a word of Swedish. I am sad, I 
am almost crying when I go home to my town and see this. It’s a disaster for the town. It’s 
a personal disaster for me to see this. My town has changed into unrecognition and no one 
does anything about it! It could be a Syrian town or an Afghan town, and it’s a Swedish 
countryside town!  
 
Gustav thus links immigration to dramatic change in his hometown. To address these alleged 
problems, one idea Gustav brought up was to reduce Sweden’s welfare state. He believes that the 
welfare state will collapse in Sweden because of the number of refugees it supports. Gustav 
proposed connecting the welfare state to Swedish citizenship to limit the welfare services 
received by immigrants. Currently, non-citizens in Sweden can access welfare benefits.  
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You can have generous benefits but you need to have control so people are not misusing 
the system. . . It’s always important with a welfare state to limit the access and make it 
temporary and not permanent. Even before mass immigration really began in Sweden too 
many Swedes were depending on the welfare state and they were getting too many benefits, 
more than benefits than they would have gained if they had a low-wage job. I am really 
against this as well because it locks people into the welfare state. 
 
 In addition to cutting down the welfare state, Gustav explained his plan to address the 
refugee crisis as it affects Sweden.  
I would go the Hungarian way and basically say that we would have zero asylum-seekers 
getting permission to stay in Sweden. The situation is so extreme now that we cannot take 
in one single more immigrant. We cannot take in a thousand, a hundred; we can take in 
zero. So many people have come here and the situation is alarming. It’s not that I don’t see 
that some people are, to some extent, fleeing from poverty, fleeing from political 
harassment, and so on. Some people are, and some people are coming here for the welfare 
state – economic immigrants. Swedes are becoming a minority in their own country. 
Malmö already has a Swedish minority. It will take just 10 or 15 years until Swedes are a 
minority in the state as a whole. I don’t care about the purpose people are coming to 
Sweden. We cannot take any more people whatsoever. We cannot accept the people who 
are already here who have applied for asylum. That would mean the end of the welfare 
state. We have to send them back to either the first country they entered in Europe as they 
should have, or, we send them back to Syria, a refugee camp. They shouldn’t have applied 
for asylum in Sweden anyway. According to the Dublin rules you have to apply for asylum 
in the first country you visit in Europe. So it’s impossible that Sweden would be the first 
country you visit in Europe! I would have zero immigration. The only immigration I would 
have in Sweden is high-quality working immigration where we need them on the labor 
market. Labor immigration in highly competitive jobs, advanced jobs. That would be useful 
immigration for Sweden. . . You don’t see many problems with European immigration 
here, or Western immigration. It’s not that I’m totally obsessed with everyone being 
Swedish, but generally, European and Western immigration works. That kind of 
immigration is completely different than the immigration we are having from the third 
world.  
 
Gustav’s rhetoric illustrates his tough, critical stance against refugees and asylum-seekers 
coming into Europe. He can be generally described as anti-immigrant, but I find that his nuance 
of accepting European and Western immigration does not make him completely anti-immigrant. 
Rather, Gustav seems to have issue with migrants in Sweden who come from cultures and 
backgrounds that bear considerable difference from what may be familiar in Sweden. But, 
Gustav’s rhetoric reflects his dissatisfaction with the current system in Sweden. He describes 
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himself as anti-establishment, taking pride in being rebellious against the current system. 
Consistent with his rebellious nature, he would reverse the open-door refugee system and 
growing multiculturalism Sweden has boasted. For Gustav, the country must be rid of all its 
refugees and asylum-seekers.  
 In Gustav’s personal journey to politics and nationalism, which he describes as his 
“awakening,” themes I observed include his love and sense of duty for Sweden; anti-
establishment and rebellious nature, coupled with dissatisfaction with society; his early 
appreciation for the band Ultima Thule and Swedish history; and, desire to preserve what he 
perceives is “Swedish.”   
 
 
Figure 6. William Hahne 
 William Hahne served as Vice Chairman of SDU from 2011 to 2015. A native of 
Stockholm, 23-year old William now lives in Uppsala and studies Economics at Uppsala 
University. Prior to studying at Uppsala, William was a paratrooper in the Swedish Army. He 
continues today to serve in the Army, returning for a few weeks at a time during the year. After 
talking to William over Skype, I found he was friendly, charming, and thoughtful, and not the 
angry, hot-headed young man many newspaper articles have made him out to be. William is 
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confident in himself and in his convictions, even if his convictions are not popular with the 
Swedish mainstream. Prior to joining the Sweden Democrats at age 17, William began thinking 
about topics such as culture and diversity at a young age.41 
Maybe the abstract political feelings I had all my life started to grow when I was quite 
young, when I lived in Indonesia in Jakarta for two years when I was seven and eight-years 
old. I went to an international school and they promoted our national identity. There were 
culture days when you were supposed to share about your home country and dress in folk 
costumes and bring food from your home country. There’s probably no better time to feel 
as Swedish as when you are abroad, I would say. The school I was in, there were 70-80 
nationalities, so there were people from all around the world. That made me very interested 
in different cultures and made me want to preserve different cultures in peoples, so that in 
the future the world would consist of a pluralism, of different peoples and cultures in the 
world.  
 
 His experience in Jakarta introduced him to a starkly different world than what he 
experienced in Sweden, and also to the many different cultures comprising the world. A key 
point here is William’s mention of plurality of cultures. This means that William does not 
believe Swedish culture should dominate the world, or that any one culture should dominate over 
the others. He believes in a pluriversum,42 or a world in which all cultures are free to exist but 
that they should be kept to the native area they come from. In other words, Sweden is for 
Swedish culture; within Sweden, the Swedish culture must not be overrun by other cultures from 
around the world.  
William’s love for Sweden, frustration with society, and growing political interest led 
him to the Sweden Democrats. When he joined SD at age 17, the party was the only political 
alternative which matched his views and addressed issues that were important to him including 
problems with mass immigration and multiculturalism.  
                                               
41 William Hahne, Interview, 25 October 2015 & 24 January 2016.  
42 Note that William did not specifically say “pluriversum.” A pluriversum is a world favoring a right to difference 
and celebrating global diversity, according to Alexander Dugin’s The Fourth Political Theory, page 194.  
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I felt this strong love and pride for my country. It hurt me very much to see the Swedish 
society falling apart. Since it was clear to me why the society was falling apart, since we 
had this mass immigration, it was natural to do what I could to stop this madness. The 
problem started 40 years ago. The mass immigration started 40 years ago. So I’ve grown 
up in a multicultural society, I’ve grown up in the problems of mass immigration. It’s not 
new for anyone. But I know how Sweden was a couple decades ago and I know how it is 
to grow up in the multicultural society. So it’s easy to see what has made society this way. 
Now the immigration has escalated each and every year. The Swedish society will collapse 
in a couple years if nothing drastic happens.  
 
To address why multiculturalism and mass immigration are bad policies for Sweden, William 
turns to an explanation rooted in economics and social trust.  
The Swedish society has a very big welfare state; we have one of the highest standards of 
living in the world. Earlier, the society had a very high standard. To have a high standard, 
you must have a high tax. So, Sweden has a very high tax. Everything is fine as long as the 
people feel a common identity with one another. When you feel that the tax money goes to 
a good thing, good people you identify with that also contribute to society, then it’s no 
problem for people to pay a high tax. But now it’s thousands of people coming every year 
who don’t contribute to society or to the welfare state. So Swedes pay high taxes which go 
to social welfare for immigrants. The thing that’s happening now is you’re dismantling the 
social welfare state. The problem is that people don’t identify with each other any longer; 
[migrants] come here, they don’t learn Swedish, they don’t adapt to Swedish society, they 
don’t contribute – it’s tearing apart society and dismantling the welfare state. The social 
trust is falling apart as well. The Swedish society is developing like the American society: 
very segregated, very individualistic, everybody is on their own. But before, we were a 
collectivist society where everyone took care of each other. If you’re supposed to have a 
strong welfare state, then it’s impossible with multiculturalism. To have a strong welfare 
state, to have high taxes, you must have this community feeling and sense of identity with 
one another. For me, as someone who wants to preserve how the Swedish society always 
has been, it’s obviously a huge problem.  
 
William’s argument echoes Maureen Eger’s findings that Swedes’ support for the welfare state 
and sense of social trust decline in Swedish communities that are more heterogeneous.43 To 
William, a large welfare state is incompatible with multiculturalism. William argues that the rise 
of multiculturalism in Sweden threatens the country’s generous welfare state. His frustration 
with migrants that do not adapt or fully integrate in Sweden is also apparent here. Migrants’ 
inability to fully integrate in Swedish society speaks to the argument of declining social trust in 
                                               
43 Eger, 208-213. 
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communities; migrants and native Swedes do not feel a common identity with one another. 
Social trust deteriorates, as does welfare state support. In Sweden’s current situation, William 
supports a “cutting down” of the welfare state. He says that “In my dream society I think we 
should have a strong welfare state,” but the effects of mass immigration in Sweden today 
necessitate a reduction of the welfare state.  
I think that in today’s heterogeneous society, since we have so many immigrants or people 
with heritage from abroad, we have a really heterogeneous society. Since we have a very 
heterogeneous society, it’s impossible in the long run to have a strong welfare state, 
because a strong welfare state demands that you have a good identity between the citizens 
and you share common values and you can trust your common citizens. To have a strong 
welfare state you need a homogeneous society. Homogeneous in culture, in values, 
everything. Since Sweden has such a huge minority of immigrants, I think the welfare state 
is impossible as it is today. Now hard-working Swedes are paying for non-working 
immigrants, and that’s not sustainable in the long run.  
 
To address the immigration problems affecting Sweden, I asked William what steps he would 
take to address the immigration and refugee crisis to the extent that it affects Sweden.  
I would change the immigration policies quite drastically. I actually don’t see why Sweden 
should have any asylum-seekers at all. I think we should stop the asylum-seeker 
immigration completely, zero people. And instead we should help people abroad, people 
who are in the refugee camps in the Middle East and other areas. If you want to help people, 
then you can help so many more people for the same amount of money if they stay in the 
place they are coming from. Giving a person who is coming here to Sweden a home, food, 
social welfare, and everything, it’s so expensive, thousands of crowns. But giving a child 
in Africa, the Middle East, or Asia clean water and food and medicine, you can do it for 
much less. You can help so many more people if you do it directly in the Third World. But 
immigration to Sweden, when it comes to asylum-seekers, I would say zero. Just stop them 
at the border.  
 
In addition to stopping all new asylum-seekers wishing to enter Sweden, he adds that he would 
also send out the refugees who are currently in Sweden.  
I would not keep any in Sweden. I don’t see the point. If you have a mindset that you can 
help so many more people if you keep them in the Third World, why would you keep any 
asylum-seekers? Then you are dooming maybe ten other people on the other side of the 
world that didn’t get those resources. If you want to help people, you want to help as many 
as you can with the money that you can give.  
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William’s views on the effects of mass immigration and multiculturalism tearing apart society 
are not shared by many Swedes. But to William, most Swedes do not realize how current policies 
are ruining the Sweden they have always known.  
The people don’t understand that they are destroying the wonderful society that we have. 
We have the best country in the world, the best society in the world, we have the highest 
living standards. For thousands of years there are Swedes living in Sweden, and organically 
the Swedish society has grown in the past 13,000 years to become what it was up until 50 
years ago. Now in a few decades, we have completely torn apart everything that has grown 
organically for 13,000 years and it took 50 years to tear it apart and destroy it forever. That 
is obviously frustrating. The people can see these extreme radical changes Sweden is taking 
part in now. We are changing our demographics enormously. It’s insane how we have 
changed that in the last 50 years. So yeah, it is quite frustrating; the people don’t see it, 
they don’t understand it, they don’t want to see, they don’t want to understand. They just 
go with the flow. When I lived in Indonesia, I gained some perspective. In Indonesia, it’s 
a very poor country. You could see the poverty every day. The people had it very tough, 
and I understood that you can’t take these things that you have in Sweden for granted, 
because they are not granted almost everywhere else in the world. But people don’t 
understand it because they have had it so good here for so long.  
 
Beyond the policies of mass immigration and multiculturalism, William shares another 
frustration he has with Swedish society, one which may enable Sweden’s mass immigration and 
multiculturalism.  
The large majority of people in general are sheep who just go with the flow. People are 
very consensus-oriented; nobody wants to be outside the consensus idea or thinking. Most 
of the people, they just don’t care enough to make their own view, to make their own 
stance, to do what they think is right, to care about society or about politics; they just go 
with the flow. ‘Oh, Sweden Democrats are racist, we will not vote for them. I will do what 
I have always done without thinking about it.’ After the Second World War, all of Europe 
has had these guilty feelings and we have been indoctrinated from a young age that we 
should feel guilt for what happened in the Second World War. From the establishment, 
they think that everybody should be good people and open up their hearts and take on 
refugees, and if you don’t, you are a bad person. And no one wants to be a bad person. So 
we take more and more people and society falls apart.  
 
Despite criticism, William remains confident in his ideas and views, refusing to “go with 
the flow.” Swedes’ behavior of going with the flow was a criticism echoed by Gustav. William 
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and Gustav argue that Swedes tend to follow mainstream behavior and agree with the 
mainstream’s consensus of acceptable ideas and views.  
 
 
Figure 7. Jessica Ohlson 
 Another Swede who can be described as comfortable going against the flow is 25-year 
old Jessica Ohlson. A law graduate from Uppsala University and now working at a law firm in 
Nyköping, Jessica is more reserved than her Swedish counterparts Gustav and William. She is 
concise and matter-of-fact, sharing her views in a blunt and unaggressive manner. Growing up at 
home, Jessica’s parents often talked about politics.44 Her mother is not a member of any political 
party, and her father is a Sweden Democrat, though not actively engaged politically. Her father’s 
conservative political views opened the discussions at home to think about political issues from a 
conservative perspective.  
We always talked a lot about politics at home, especially with my dad. So it was all the 
discussions around the dinner table that made me very interested in politics initially. And 
I don’t really know what exactly it was that made me join SD and SDU, but of course it 
was about the migration policy. That’s the reason everyone joins SD and SDU. That was 
one of the things we were talking a lot about at home. And the changes in the migration 
                                               
44  Jessica Ohlson, Interview, 28 September 2015, 17 & 20 February 2016. 
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policy from when my dad was young to nowadays. So it probably was the problem that 
nobody else talked about. And none of my classmates talked about it either.  
 
Reminded of Ágnes Pánczél and her experience growing up with her parents and having political 
discussions during dinner, I asked Jessica about the political issues that her dad discussed that 
influenced her.  
It was especially how he compared how it was when he grew up to how it is now. When 
he was 10, 11, 12 years old, he and his friends could walk through Stockholm in the middle 
of the night and no one ever thought anything would happen to them. There’s a big 
difference now. You could leave your bike anywhere and it was always going to be there 
when you came back. It was a lot of these small things. And we considered how things 
have changed as he grew up. And we think that [these changes] were connected with the 
immigrants, of course.  
 
Jessica’s early conversations with her dad echo the Sweden Democrats’ rhetoric that things were 
better in Sweden in an earlier time. Noting her dad’s role influencing her views early on, Jessica 
said she was certain of her political opinion from an early age. During Sweden’s 2006 national 
elections, she voted for the Sweden Democrats in a school election at the age of 16.  
Jessica eventually took her political interest further and joined the Sweden Democrats in 
2008, though she was not actively involved. Prior to 2012, she spent most of her time riding 
horses. Once she began spending less time working with horses, she had extra time at her 
disposal and started attending SDU meetings in Uppsala in September 2012.  At that time, SDU 
in Uppsala was small with only a few members. This small size made it easy and natural to take 
on many responsibilities and leadership roles in SDU. By early 2013, Jessica was a board 
member of SDU Uppsala. She continued to become more involved over time, working in the 
Swedish Riksdag for SD and serving on the board of SDU at the national level where she worked 
closely with Gustav and William. Jessica joined at a time when the current refugee crisis 
affecting Europe was only escalating and a major financial crisis rocked the EU. When 
I n g i n o  | 48 
 
discussing why she joined SD and why people are drawn to SD, her rhetoric hearkens to 
frustration with mass immigration to Sweden and the country’s open-door refugee policy.   
If we talk about refugees, of course it is because people want to help [the refugees]. And 
[Swedes] feel we can help [the refugees] most if they come here. But it is better to put the 
money there where they already are, so they don’t have to move across the whole of 
Europe. But that’s one of the biggest reasons I think when we talk about the refugees. But 
when we talk about other immigrants, there is a picture in Sweden where a lot of people 
think it is positive in Sweden to have a lot of immigrants. But no one has shown 
economically that it is positive. But still people think it is and they think [immigrants] 
create jobs and opportunities. We say it is the opposite, that [immigration] is not positive 
for the society.  
 
 To address the refugee crisis, Jessica explains that Sweden cannot accept such large 
numbers of refugees for economic reasons.  
I still think we need to put money where it’s the most effective, and that is to put the money 
in the surrounding countries from where the refugees come from. This is because most of 
the people can’t move out of the country they’ve grown up in, or the surrounding countries, 
so that’s where we need to put the [foreign aid] that we can afford. But we also have to 
realize Sweden is a very small country and we can’t do as much as we want to do. We have 
problems here, too. We have a lot of old people that don’t have the life they deserve, so we 
need to put money there. We need to put money to schools to care for our children. So I 
really think we should put the money where it’s the most effective, rather than to take a 
few people here to Sweden. Since 2008, it’s not just a few [migrants], there’s a lot of 
[migrants] who are in Sweden. So it’s a problem right now that we want to have as many 
[migrants] as possible, and a lot of people are coming here because they know they get help 
when they come to Sweden. And in the meantime, we want to put more money in the 
surrounding countries, and the United Nations, and other help organizations. So now we 
put a lot of money in many places. And while it works for now, at the end of the year there 
will not be that much money left, I think.  
 
Jessica argues that mass immigration is not only problematic to Sweden for economic reasons, 
but also because of what she considers the (in)ability of migrants to fully integrate into Swedish 
society and become ‘Swedish.’ 
There are a lot of different people coming to Sweden. If you’ve grown up in a country that 
looks a lot like Sweden and we have almost the same rules and the same culture, it’s quite 
easy to become a Swede if you learn the language and all that. But I think there’s people 
from many places in the world that never can become Swedish, mainly because they never 
want to. They don’t want to become part of the Swedish culture. And then I don’t think 
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you can become a Swede. All the other politicians in Sweden say that you can become a 
Swede as long as you live in Sweden, but that’s not my opinion.  
 
Jessica’s rhetoric indicates that she believes there is more to being Swedish than simply living in 
Sweden. Perhaps, if a migrant comes from a country culturally similar to Sweden, it is possible 
to become Swedish. Along this same point, she believes migrants from culturally different 
countries cannot become Swedish. The refugees currently arriving in Sweden, coming from areas 
that are significantly different culturally, will never be Swedish in Jessica’s eyes. Jessica’s 
frustration with immigration is heightened by other Swedish political parties’ actions to silence 
SD and shut down conversations SD has around topics like immigration and refugees.  
There is an arrangement between all the other parties in the Swedish government: they all 
vote for the same things. The Social Democrats, who are in charge, have made an 
arrangement with all the other parties so that they do not vote against them. It is only to 
stop us, SD, from having influence. So that’s a big thing why people are coming to us now, 
because all the other parties, they just say the same things and vote for the same things, 
while we’re the only one saying something different. Right now, that’s probably the biggest 
reason. Right now, I think we have 2,000 immigrants to Sweden every day, and people see 
there’s no room [for these immigrants]: there’s no places to live, no work.  
 
Jessica’s political engagement is rooted in cultural nationalism and ethnic nationalism. While the 
refugee immigration to Sweden is undoubtedly a major issue for her, economic immigration is 
also problematic because of its unproven benefit.  
 
Chapter 5: Synthesis 
The motivations for young Europeans to identify with contemporary radical nationalism 
vary widely. From the outset of this paper I asked, what motivates the nationalism of youth in 
Europe today? The findings of my interviews reflect that nationalism appeals to young people 
coming from a variety of backgrounds, and their nationalism and core beliefs varied according to 
their context.    
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As illustrated across Belgium, Hungary, and Sweden, nationalist ideologies play out in 
their own ways across uniquely different contexts. For example, Jobbik calls for a shift toward 
the East and uses rhetoric indicating more favorable sentiment toward the Islamic world. The 
favorable rhetoric and attitudes they express for Islam makes Jobbik distinctly different from 
supporters of Vlaams Belang and the Sweden Democrats. Further, multiculturalism, 
immigration, and the refugee crisis are important, but not as important for them as issues related 
to the Roma population and criminality. The views of Ágnes, Péter, and Szabolcs reflect 
Identitarian ideas, meaning that they believe in a world of cultural plurality and a right to 
difference for all people, no matter their religion, culture, or background.  
  By contrast, Tom Van Grieken and his party Vlaams Belang are not interested in the 
East and have no sympathy for the Islamic world. Tom is an outspoken and passionate critic of 
multiculturalism and Islam. In interviews, demonstrations, and on social media, he incessantly 
demands that Belgium close its borders, cease all forms of immigration, and remove all the 
refugees who have arrived there. Not only are these issues important to Tom, but he is also a 
Flemish nationalist, not a Belgian nationalist. He envisions an independent Flemish state. 
Separatism is a goal which does not exist for Jobbik. The issues that are important to Tom do not 
all resemble those that are important to Ágnes, Péter, and Szabolcs. While Ágnes, Péter, and 
Szabolcs can be considered Identitarian, Tom’s rhetoric reflects cultural nationalism.  
 Gustav, William, and Jessica care about more similar issues to Tom than they do to the 
Hungarians. They also attack multiculturalism, immigration, and the refugee crisis as Tom does. 
They do support a right to difference and plurality of cultures across the world, suggesting that 
Muslims have their own right to practice Islam in Islamic countries. This rhetoric may appear 
favorable toward Islam, but they do not support any influence of Islam or of Muslims in Sweden. 
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Gustav, William, and Jessica’s rhetoric toward Islam was less favorable than the Hungarians’ 
was, and the three Swedes used rhetoric that more closely resembled Tom Van Grieken’s 
regarding issues of multiculturalism, immigration, and the refugee crisis. Similar to Jobbik, they 
also have no separatist agenda as Vlaams Belang does. The cultural plurality and right to 
difference rhetoric indicates Identitarianism; but, Gustav, William, and Jessica also possess 
cultural nationalism. They are therefore a mix of both Identitarianism and cultural nationalism. 
 The interviewees’ rhetoric illustrates the differences in nationalist beliefs across a variety 
contexts from Belgium to Hungary to Sweden. While their rhetoric and views demonstrate the 
diversity in contemporary nationalism among young people, it is also clear that they hold certain 
similarities. For example, they all claim to be driven by feelings of patriotism and national love. 
However, the different ways in which this national love grew and developed varied across the 
interviewees. For example, Ágnes Pánczél and Gustav Kasselstrand both described the influence 
of learning about history and listening to certain music that played a role in inspiring feelings of 
love and pride in Hungary and Sweden, respectively. While the influence of history and music 
do not explain their political activism as nationalists, they do serve as sources from which 
feelings of national love and pride may stem.  
Although Ágnes and Gustav described their appreciation for history and music, not all of 
the other interviewees cited these same factors. Others, such as Jessica Ohlson and her love for 
Sweden, seemed to feel innate national pride that they had experienced for most of their lives. 
For all of the interviewees, they described their personal identity in terms of their own nation and 
national culture. Their national identity is a component of their personal identity. By extension, 
they are proud of their national identity and therefore their personal identity, and they seek to 
preserve these identities against outside influence.    
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The interview subjects’ desire to preserve their national identities against outside 
influence is an expression of their opposition to multiculturalism. Opposition to multiculturalism 
may simply be due to a drive to keep Sweden “Swedish” and Hungary “Hungarian,” for 
example, but it may also reflect an aversion to outsider groups. An example of this can be seen 
from Péter Völgyi’s rhetoric in which he describes some multiculturalism as good, and some 
multiculturalism as bad. For Péter, multiculturalism was good to the extent that it comprised 
individuals exchanging information and stories about their different cultures. In Hungary, 
multiculturalism is not so bad right now because there are not too many immigrants. But, 
multiculturalism became bad in places like France, Brussels, and Britain, according to Péter. It is 
bad in those places because he believes there are too many people from different places, from 
different cultures, who behave in ways that he deems strange.45 Péter’s story about good and bad 
multiculturalism illustrates how an opposition to multiculturalism is an expression of opposition 
to groups that are racially and culturally different. This aversion to “outsider” groups that live in 
the domestic borders of the interviewees’ respective nations is a trend that may be true for many 
of the interview subjects.  
Another similarity is that they believe their party of choosing is the only one discussing 
the taboo issues that no one else touches. With every individual I interviewed, they were drawn 
to their party because it was one that talked about issues no one else dared touch. They were 
dissatisfied with some aspect of their society, or several aspects. Whether in Belgium, Hungary, 
or Sweden, these youth found that Vlaams Belang, Jobbik, and the Sweden Democrats, 
respectively, opened discussions on topics that the mainstream, established political parties did 
not touch. For each of the interviewees, they felt they had finally found a party that aligned with 
                                               
45 Péter Völgyi, Interview, 8 November 2015.  
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their own personal ideas and views. While they felt they found a party that talked about issues 
they cared about, their anti-establishment rhetoric also became apparent. This rhetoric took 
different forms, such as by criticizing the political correctness of the mainstream media or 
established political parties, criticizing others of “going with the flow” and fearing to act outside 
of mainstream ideas, or dissatisfaction with the current system.  
Anti-establishment rhetoric has an “us vs. them” effect, pitting the establishment against 
those outside the establishment. The “establishment” can be considered, generally speaking, the 
government, its policies, and institutions; mainstream political parties and politicians; 
mainstream media; and, all people who are a part of or working within this “system.” To 
disagree with the establishment would be to disagree with the status quo, to act against the 
mainstream ideas and behavior. They are comfortable identifying with a party that is looked at 
negatively by the mainstream and holding views that are considered too radical for some. The 
interviewees possess an anti-establishment, rebellious nature. 
 Work by Alexander Oaten describes anti-establishment rhetoric in terms of a collective 
victimhood argument.46 Oaten illustrates how anti-establishment rhetoric, which is seen with the 
interviewees, plays to a narrative of victimization. As the interviewees describe an “us vs. them” 
narrative in terms of themselves against the establishment, they also describe themselves and 
their supporters as the true victims of the establishment. A feeling of collective victimhood 
against the establishment may encourage the interviewees and others like them to feel a sense of 
duty to fight against and criticize the establishment.   
A final point about similarities across the interviewees is that they view themselves as 
part of a collective identity positioned against a certain ‘other,’ or outsider group. For all of the 
                                               
46 Oaten, 331, 339-340.  
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interviewees, one common group of outsiders is refugees. But, refugees are the only group that 
they mutually oppose.  
In the case of Tom Van Grieken and Vlaams Belang, the population composing Flanders’ 
collective identity is Flemish people. Aside from refugees, the outsiders are also French-speaking 
Walloons. The Walloons as an outsider group for Vlaams Belang distinguishes it from the cases 
in Hungary and Sweden. It also speaks to Vlaams Belang’s movement to separate entirely from 
Wallonia and become their own independent country of Flanders.  
 For Jobbik supporters Ágnes, Péter, and Szabolcs in Hungary, the group making up their 
collective identity is Hungarian people. Refugees are one outsider group, but so is Hungary’s 
Gypsy population and possibly Hungarian Jews as well. The Gypsy and Jewish populations in 
Hungary comprise an outsider group that is shared in neither Belgium nor Sweden.  
Swedish people are the group that Gustav, William, and Jessica identify with. The group 
that they do not identify with is refugees in Sweden. Unlike with supporters from Vlaams Belang 
and Jobbik, refugees are the only ‘other’ group that they take issue with in Sweden.  
In Belgium, Hungary, and Sweden, these outsider groups which are not part of what the 
interviewees perceive as their national collective identity pose problems. The interviewees’ 
rhetoric demonstrates how they believe these groups are harmful to their respective nations, and 
how their parties can resolve these issues.  
 A final note to discuss is the seeming paradox of young people emphasizing traditional 
values. Young people are often thought to represent progressivism, while traditional ideas and 
values are reserved to older generations. Each of the individuals I interviewed encourage 
preserving traditional rituals and values in society. Most of the interviewees described tradition 
in relation to cultural rituals, values, and holidays that are practiced or celebrated in their nations. 
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One concrete example of tradition that was described by both Ágnes Pánczél and Péter Völgyi of 
Jobbik was the annual Hungarian celebration Busójárás in which people dress up in costumes to 
scare away winter at the end of Carnival season. For Ágnes and Péter, Busójárás is one example 
of a national tradition that they deem important to preserve.   
But the question remains, why are youth drawn to traditionalism when they are expected 
to be more progressive? One explanation is that for them, traditionalism represents a 
counterweight to change. In the experiences that the interviewees discussed, things changed over 
time in a way that they perceive as bad. An example of this is Gustav Kasselstrand’s story about 
his hometown Valdemarsvik. In Gustav’s narrative, he describes his hometown and upbringing 
as “very Swedish” and with the influence of almost no immigrants. However, when he returns to 
Valdemarsvik now, he claims that it is “beyond recognition” because it is overrun by refugees.47 
The change that Gustav describes to have witnessed in his own hometown is not only a bad 
thing, but it is the result of mass immigration and refugees in Sweden. This experience reflects a 
resistance to change and a belief that things were better before than they are now. The 
interviewees’ call for traditionalism may be their way of expressing how they believe things 
were better for them before than they are now. Returning to traditionalism, in their view, 
represents a return to how thing were before.  
 
Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 What motivates the radical nationalism of young Europeans today? In this paper, I 
discussed the differences across young Europeans by focusing on individual interview subjects. 
Across the interviewees, I derived a set of common themes, including dissatisfied, anti-
                                               
47 Gustav Kasselstrand, Interview, 22 November 2015.  
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establishment rhetoric, a call for traditionalism and resistance to change, self-proclaimed love for 
the nation, aversion to outsider groups, and rhetoric which frames their national identity against a 
domestic ‘other’ group. Through this research, I delivered a humanized, individual account into 
what motivates the nationalism of young Europeans. 
The information and insight gained through each interview helps broaden understanding 
and brought a more humanized aspect to nationalist youth in Europe. In this regard, I fulfilled 
one of my personal goals in this project. However, this research would be improved with a larger 
spread of individuals, both in terms of quantity and their political experience. In Belgium and 
Sweden, I focused on leaders. In Hungary, I had a slightly broader range, including both leaders 
and rank and file members. But in the case of all three countries, my work took on more of a 
personal, individual-level nature in looking at each of the individuals I interviewed, due to the 
small size of my interview pool. Future research on this subject should consider a wider range of 
interview subjects, and may either consider a wider range of countries or focus on one country to 
deliver a more focused analysis. The purpose and benefit of expanding the interview pool is to 
either reinforce the themes I found, or to challenge and possibly reject these themes.   
 Although there were drawbacks and limitations to the research, this work brings forward 
individual-level insight into what draws young European people toward nationalism. Not only 
does the research reveal motivations for nationalism, it also demonstrates the differences across 
various contexts of nationalist views. Aside from opposing refugee migration, there is no 
common nationalist ideology across European nations. Nationalist views, whether it is Vlaams 
Belang in Belgium, Jobbik in Hungary, or the Sweden Democrats in Sweden, differ across 
different countries and contexts. While my interview subject pool was small, these individuals 
illustrated the differences in their ideologies across various contexts.  
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 The research demonstrates the differences in contemporary nationalism across European 
contexts. The differences that arise include their attitudes toward Islam, attitudes toward 
particular minority groups or ‘outsider’ groups, and differences in Identitarian or cultural 
nationalist ideologies. Aside from the differences that arise among nationalists, the research 
contributes an understanding of the similarities that exist. Observed similarities in the 
interviewees include their feelings of self-proclaimed national love, anti-establishment and 
rebellious nature, aversion to outsider groups, a call for traditionalism and resistance to change, 
and rhetoric which frames their national identity against a domestic ‘other’ group.  
By utilizing personal interviews with young nationalists from Belgium, Hungary, and 
Sweden, I have provided a humanized, individual-level insight into understanding the differences 
in nationalism across a sample of European countries while simultaneously identifying 
similarities among them. Future research on this subject should consider a larger number yet 
possibly more specific pool of interview subjects. By increasing the number of interviewees 
while narrowing the parameters such as by interviewee age, country of origin, or level of 
leadership in the party, further research may be able to determine whether the differences and 




“Austria, Finland and Sweden: 20 Years in the EU.” 2015. Flash Eurobarometer 407. European  
Commission Report.  
De Benoist, Alain and Charles Champetier. 1999.  “Manifesto of the French New Right in Year  
2000.” New European Conservative.  
I n g i n o  | 58 
 
Eger, M. A. 2010. “Even in Sweden: The Effect of Immigration on Support for Welfare State  
Spending.” European Sociological Review 26, (2): 203-217.   
Erk, Jan. 2005. “From Vlaams Blok to Vlaams Belang: The Belgian Far-Right Renames Itself.”  
West European Politics 28, (3): 493-502.  
Faas, Daniel. 2007. “Youth, Europe and the Nation: The Political Knowledge, Interests and  
Identities of the New Generation of European Youth.” Journal of Youth Studies 10 (2): 
161-81. 
Fülöp, Márta and Alistair Ross. 2005. “Growing Up in Europe Today: Developing Identities  
Among Adolescents.” European Issues in Children’s Identities and Citizenship, Vol. 6. 
Trentham.  
France, Alan, Jo Meredith, and Adriana Sandu. 2007. Youth Culture and  
Citizenship in Multicultural Britain. Journal of Contemporary European Studies 15 (3): 
303-16. 
“Future of Europe.” 2014. Special Eurobarometer 413. European Commission Report. 
Hazekamp, Jan Laurens and Keith Popple. 1997. Racism in Europe: A Challenge for Youth  
Policy and Youth Work. University College.  
Hellström, Anders, Tom Nilsson, Faculty of Culture and Society, and Malmö University. 2010.  
'We are the Good Guys': Ideological Positioning of the Nationalist Party 
Sverigedemokraterna in Contemporary Swedish Politics. Ethnicities 10 (1): 55-76. 
Hellström, Anders, Tom Nilsson, and Pauline Stoltz. 2012. Nationalism vs. Nationalism: The  
Challenge of the Sweden Democrats in the Swedish Public Debate. Government and 
Opposition 47 (2): 186-205.  
Hoskins, Bryony, Michaela Saisana, and Cynthia M. H. Villalba. 2015. Civic Competence of  
I n g i n o  | 59 
 
Youth in Europe: Measuring Cross National Variation through the Creation of a 
Composite Indicator. Social Indicators Research 123 (2): 431-57. 
Jobbik. 2015. “Jobbik Movement for a Better Hungary.” Accessed 21 September 2015. 
http://www.jobbik.com/.  
Loader, Brian D.  2007. Young Citizens in the Digital Age: Political Engagement, Young  
People and New Media. Routledge.  
Loobuyck, Patrick, and Dirk Jacobs. 2009. “Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Integration  
Policy in Belgium and Flanders.” Canadian Issues: S29.  
“L’Opinion Publique dans l’Union Européenne.” 2014. Eurobaromètre Standard 82. Rapport par  
la Commission Européenne.  
Mayda, Anna Maria. 2006. “Who Is Against Immigration? A Cross-country Investigation of  
Individual Attitudes Toward Immigrants”. The Review of Economics and Statistics 88 
(3). The MIT Press: 510–30.  
Mulinari, Diana, Anders Neergaard, Linköpings Universitet, REMESO - Institutet för Forskning  
om Migration, Etnicitet och Samhälle, and Filosofiska fakulteten. 2014. We are Sweden 
Democrats because we care for others: Exploring Racisms in the Swedish Extreme Right. 
European Journal of Women's Studies 21 (1): 43-56.  
Moufahim, Mona, Patrick Reedy, and Michael Humphreys. 2015. The Vlaams Belang: The  
Rhetoric of Organizational Identity. Organization Studies 36 (1): 91-111. 
Oaten, Alexander. "The Cult of the Victim: An Analysis of the Collective Identity of the English  
Defence League." Patterns of Prejudice 48.4 (2014): 331-49. Web. 
Oskarson, Maria and Marie Demker. 2015. “Room for Realignment: The Working-Class  
Sympathy for Sweden Democrats.” Government and Opposition, 50: 629-651. 
I n g i n o  | 60 
 
Petsinis, Vassilis. 2015. The ‘New’ Far Right in Hungary: A Political Psychologist's Perspective.  
Journal of Contemporary European Studies, Vol. 23, Iss. 2. 
Pirro, Andrea L. P. 2015. “The Populist Radical Right in Central and Eastern Europe: Ideology,  
Impact, and Electoral Performance.” Vol. 27. London: Routledge.  
Rydgren, Jens. 2010. "Radical Right-Wing Populism in Denmark and Sweden: Explaining Party  
System Change and Stability." The SAIS Review of International Affairs 30 (1): 57-71.   
Samad, Yunas and Kasturi Sen. 2007. “Islam in the European Union: Transnationalism, Youth  
and the War on Terror.” Oxford University Press. New York. 
Scheepers, P. L. H., H. A. F. H. Werts, and M. Lubbers. 2013. “Euro-scepticism and Radical  
Right-wing Voting in Europe, 2002-2008: Social Cleavages, Socio-political Attitudes and  
Contextual Characteristics Determining Voting for the Radical Right.” European Union 
Politics 14, (2): 183-205.  
Sedgwick, Mark. 2004. Against the Modern World: Traditionalism and the Secret Intellectual  
History of the Twentieth Century. Oxford University Press. USA.  
Skott-Myhre, Hans Arthur. 2009. “Youth and Subculture as Creative Force: Creating New  
Spaces for Radical Youth Work.” University of Toronto Press.  
Sverigedemokraterna. 2014. "Sverigedemokraterna - Det Sverigevänliga Partiet." Accessed 18  
September 2015. http://sverigedemokraterna.se/ 
Sverigedemokratisk Ungdom. 2015. “SDU: Sverigedemokratisk Ungdom.” Accessed 20  
September 2015. http://www.sverigedemokratiskungdom.se/   
Teitelbaum, Benjamin R. 2013. “Come Hear our Merry Song”: Shifts in the Sound of 
Contemporary Swedish Radical Nationalism. Ph.D. Dissertation, Brown University. 
Teitelbaum, Benjamin R. (forthcoming) Lions of the North: Sounds of the New Nordic Radical  
I n g i n o  | 61 
 
Nationalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
van den Berg, Job C, and Hilde Coffe. 2012. “Educational and Class Cleavages in Voting  
Behaviour in Belgium: The Effect of Income, EGP Class and Education on Party Choice 
in Flanders and Wallonia.” Acta Politica 47 (2): 151-80. 
Widfeldt, Anders. 2008. “Party Change as a Necessity - the Case of the Sweden Democrats.”  
Representation 44 (3): 265-76.  
YouTube. 2014. “SDU: Salute to the European Youth.” Sverigedemokratisk Ungdom. Accessed  
18 September 2015. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VR-lAGj_dlQ.  
